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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this first presidential election year following the enactment 
of the most sweeping change in campaign finance reform laws in a 
generation—the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) 
(better known as the McCain-Feingold Law in honor of its chief 
Senate sponsors)1—tax-exempt organizations have received 
unprecedented attention.  Political operatives, regulators, 
commentators, and advocates on both sides of the campaign 
finance debate have focused intensely on nonprofit organizations.  
Those organized under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code have 
been subject to particular scrutiny, and this once obscure provision 
 
 1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81 (codified in scattered new and amended sections of 2 U.S.C. & 36 U.S.C. § 510 
(West 2004)).   
2
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has now become a regular feature of newspaper headlines. 
The country’s deeply felt political divisions have driven 
political combatants on both sides to see victory in the 2004 
elections as essential, yet BCRA prevents these eager advocates 
from pouring unlimited resources into traditional political party 
structures.  With unlimited giving to political parties now curtailed,2 
those with political agendas have been experimenting with various 
types of tax-exempt structures to create entities that can promote 
issues or candidates within the scope of both federal tax and 
election law.3  Thus, they have looked to the federal tax code to 
determine what other types of organizations may be available to 
run advertising and conduct activities on the ground to activate 
voters.  While 527 organizations have received the most press to 
date, various types of 501(c) organizations are also able to carry out 
this type of advocacy agenda, and many are actively engaged in 
electoral campaigns.   
Meanwhile, advocates intent on protecting or reforming the 
political system see the stratagems of the ideologues as attempts to 
exploit “loopholes” in the law and undermine its effectiveness.4  
Pro-reform advocates are emboldened by back-to-back wins: 1) the 
passage of BCRA after many long years of work and debate; and 2) 
the Supreme Court’s broad endorsement of the law in McConnell v. 
 
 2. 2 U.S.C. § 441i (West 2004). 
 3. Of course other activities are happening in the context of state and local 
elections and may be subject to various state and local election laws.  
Organizations exempt from federal income taxation must traverse the equally 
tricky intersections between federal tax law and state election laws, not to mention 
additional complexities that may be added by state tax laws or other state laws.  
Although the information in this article about election-related activities under 
federal tax law is equally applicable to these state and local efforts, a full 
exploration of the relationship between these laws and any state election law is 
beyond the scope of this article.  See Rosemary E. Fei, Diane M. Fishburn, & 
Barbara K. Rhomberg, The Public Charity’s Guide to the California Initiative Process 
(providing an example of a practical guide to compliance with federal tax and one 
state’s election laws), at http://www.ncg.org/assets/NCGpubliccharityguide.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2004). 
 4. Whether use of tax-exempt organizations as vehicles for political advocacy 
constitutes a circumvention of campaign finance regulation depends in large part 
upon what one considers the purpose of BCRA to have been.  Independent 
advocacy organizations do not undermine the goal of taking candidates and 
officeholders out of the business of raising unlimited amounts of soft money for 
political campaigns, a result that the authors consider BCRA has significantly 
achieved.  If the goal is limiting the ability of citizens to spend money on political 
speech, the availability of independent nonprofit organizations to fund and 
engage in such speech certainly means that goal has not been attained. 
3
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Federal Election Commission,5 a ruling notable for the Court’s 
willingness to accede to Congressional restrictions on electoral 
activity that Congress deemed necessary to protect the political 
system from the potentially corruptive influence of money on 
politics.  Campaign reform advocates are eager to defend these 
recent victories, and many seem eager to ride the momentum even 
further. 
As the 2004 federal election season commenced, the tax-
exempt organizations being created by the political operatives were 
the next likely target for scrutiny.  Both reform advocates and 
actors with a more clearly self-interested, partisan agenda6 sought 
to extend the reach of the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) 
authority to regulate organizations and activities beyond those that 
the FEC has historically been able or willing to regulate. 
These two powerful forces—political advocates and campaign 
reformers—collided in the spring of 2004 in the hearing room of 
the FEC, a collision at the crossroads of tax and election law.  The 
FEC was urged to adopt broad definitions of regulable political 
activity drawn from the tax law.7  Other commentators8 urged that 
the vagueness of those definitions, vagueness perhaps tolerable for 
tax-exempt organizations, was unacceptable as guidance for those 
engaged in essential political debate.  Faced with a politically 
sensitive and enormously complex task, the FEC voted to put off its 
rulemaking for ninety days.  As this article was headed for 
 
 5. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 
 6. The coalition of strange bedfellows included traditional reform groups 
such as the Center for Responsive Politics and partisans such as the Republican 
National Committee, both of which had previously been staunch foes of campaign 
finance regulation.  See E-mail comments regarding NPRM 2004-6 from 
Democracy 21, the Campaign Legal Center, and the Center for Responsive 
Politics, to Ms. Mai T. Dinh, Acting Assistant General Counsel, Federal Election 
Commission, (April 5, 2004), at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/political_ 
comm_status/comments.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004). See also Comments 
regarding NPRM 2004-6 from Republican National Committee to Ms. Mai T. 
Dinh, Acting Assistant General Counsel, Federal Election Commission, (April 5, 
2004), at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/political_comm_status/comments.html 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2004). 
 7. See NPRM 2004-6, supra note †, at 11756–57 (discussing I.R.C. § 100.5, 
Alternative 2-A and Alternative 2-B that defined some or all entities organized 
under I.R.C. § 527 as “political committees” for purposes of federal election law). 
Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations in this article to the 
Internal Revenue Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended, currently located at 26 U.S.C.A. (West 2004).   
 8. The authors’ law firm was one of those commenting.  (Indeed, those 
comments form the basis for much of this article.) 
4
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publication, the FEC again took up proposals to regulate 527s, but 
the only proposal that found the necessary four votes from among 
the commissioners did not include sweeping regulation of 527s.  
Nonetheless, the regulatory engines may yet roar back to life.  
Reform groups have expressed anger at the FEC decision and may 
seek restrictions on 527 organizations through other means—
perhaps litigation or congressional action.9   
In light of this vastly increased interest in political advocacy by 
tax-exempt organizations, this article will look at the tax law’s 
definitions of “political” activity by § 501(c)(3)s, other § 501(c)s, 
and § 527s, identifying the many points of congruence and the 
occasional important differences.  We further attempt to explain 
why the FEC’s detour onto the slippery pavement of tax law led to 
this crash, and why attempts to follow the tax law’s definitions of 
political activity will inevitably lead regulatory efforts astray.  The 
legal roads of tax and election law begin from different policy 
rationales, intersect in seemingly similar concepts, but then 
proceed to wildly different legal destinations.  We conclude with a 
discussion of why, as a matter of constitutional law, laws that suffice 
for tax purposes are fatally flawed for election law uses.  It is our 
hope that this analysis will at least steer proponents of campaign 
finance reform away from another foreseeable crash.10 
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS: A PRIMER ON TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS AND IRS GUIDANCE 
We begin with a brief overview of the types of tax-exempt 
organizations discussed below, followed by a quick detour to 
provide an introduction to the various types of Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) guidance documents upon which the article draws. 
 
 9.  See Statement by Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 on FEC 
Failure Yesterday to Stop 527 Groups from Illegally Spending Soft Money on 
Attack Ads (Aug. 20, 2004), at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/press-
1278.html; Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Votes 4-2 to Adopt Limited New Rule Requiring 
‘Hard Money’ for Some 527 Groups, BNA MONEY & POL. REP., Aug. 20, 2004. 
 10. The authors do not oppose, in theory, regulatory attempts to define more 
clearly and, perhaps more broadly, the scope of FEC-regulated “political 
committees,” the primary focus of the recent rulemaking.  See supra Part I.  Our 
primary concern is the appropriation of tax law concepts for other purposes.  The 
forces driving the development of tax definitions are not compatible with other 
constitutionally permissible regulatory ends. 
5
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A. Tax-Exempt Organizations 
The universe of nonprofit organizations consists largely, but 
not entirely, of tax-exempt organizations.  Nonprofit corporations 
or associations, like their for-profit counterparts, are creatures of 
state law.  Federal tax law separately provides for exemption from 
federal income taxation of entities that fall into certain specifically 
enumerated categories.  By way of introduction for those readers 
who do not spend their days immersed in the U.S. Tax Code, the 
different types of organizations discussed in this article are briefly 
outlined below.11 
The most common type of tax-exempt organization is 
organized under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 501(c)(3).  In 
addition to being exempt from paying income tax themselves,12 
501(c)(3)s enjoy the additional advantage of receiving tax-
deductible charitable contributions.13  The activities of these 
organizations must be almost entirely educational, charitable, 
religious, or scientific.14  Thus, these organizations include non-
profit healthcare providers and other human service organizations, 
educational institutions, nonpartisan policy research organizations, 
churches and other religious institutions, and foundations and 
other grant-making organizations.  Section 501(c)(3)s that qualify 
as “public charities” are permitted to lobby to a limited extent;15 all 
501(c)(3)s are strictly prohibited from intervening in campaigns 
for elected public office.16 
A 501(c)(4) organization is a “social welfare organization” or 
“civic league” that may pursue educational, lobbying, and political 
 
 11. This is by no means an exhaustive or authoritative description of these 
organizations or the rules that apply to their operations.  Readers seeking more 
detail should review the IRS Publication, Tax-Exempt Status for Your 
Organization.  See I.R.S. Pub. 557 (Rev. May 2003).  Readers should also review any 
of several credible texts on the subject, the most prominent of which is Bruce 
Hopkins’ The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations.  BRUCE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF 
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter HOPKINS]. 
 12. I.R.C. § 501(a).   
 13. Id.  § 170(a)(1). 
 14. Id. § 501(c)(3).  These organizations may also be engaged in literary 
activities, testing for public safety, fostering international amateur sports 
competition, or prevention of cruelty to children or animals.  Id. 
 15. See id.  (“[N]o substantial . . . activities . . . attempting to influence 
legislation”) (emphasis added). See also id. § 501(h) (permitting lobbying by 
certain public charities within certain expenditure limits). 
 16. Id.  § 501(c)(3). 
6
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activities.17  501(c)(4)s are exempt from most federal taxes,18 but 
contributions to a 501(c)(4) organization are not tax-deductible.19  
A 501(c)(4)’s “primary” activities must be those that benefit the 
public, including any activity in which a 501(c)(3) organization 
may legally engage.20  Although not the focus of this article, 
501(c)(5) labor organizations and 501(c)(6) business associations 
are subject to similar restrictions.21 
Section 527 is the section of the Tax Code for many different 
types of political organizations.  These political organizations may 
be independent organizations, incorporated or not, or they may be 
organized merely as a fund established by a 501(c) organization 
under § 527(f).22  Section 527 organizations are generally exempt 
from federal income tax, but do pay tax on investment income.23  
Gifts to 527s are expressly exempted from the estate and gift tax.24  
Political parties and campaigns are classified for tax purposes 
under § 527, as are various types of non-candidate political 
committees such as federal and state Political Action Committees 
(PACs).25  Section 527 organizations that are not registered with the 
FEC must register with the IRS.26  Those that do not disclose their 
receipts and expenditures to the FEC or a similar state agency must 
file periodic reports with the IRS. 27  Both the registrations and 
regular reports are publicly available.28  In recent years, “527” has 
 
 17. See id. § 501(c)(4) (defining organization).  See also discussion infra Part 
IV.B (discussing IRS precedential and nonprecedential guidance regarding 
advocacy by § 501(c)(4) organizations). 
 18. I.R.C. § 501(a). 
 19. Cf. id. § 170(c) (defining charitable contributions as implicitly excluding 
contributions to  § 501(c)(4) organizations). 
 20. See id. § 501(c)(4). See also infra Part IV.A (discussing definition of “social 
welfare” activities). 
 21. I.R.C. § 501(c)(5)–(6); Gen. Couns. Mem. 34, 233 (Dec. 3, 1969) 
(reversing prior IRS position that political campaign intervention could be sole 
activity of a § 501(c)(6) organization if shown to be germane to its exempt 
purpose and concluding that candidate support transcends the narrower exempt 
purpose of a business association and cannot be its primary activity). 
 22. See id. § 527(f). 
 23. Id. § 527. 
 24. Id. § 2501(a)(5). 
 25. Throughout this article, we use “PAC” as a simple way of describing a 
political committee subject to the state or federal legal restrictions, such as federal 
election law restrictions on the size and source of contributions.  Our use of this 
term is meant to convey a distinction from so-called “soft” 527s discussed infra Part 
V. 
 26. I.R.C. § 527(i). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Information for Political Organizations, 
7
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become shorthand for non-party, non-PAC political organizations.  
It is generally used to refer to those political organizations that are 
required to file publicly available reports of their contributions and 
expenditures with the IRS.  Although the authors are frustrated 
with this somewhat misleading short-hand, we have not been able 
to come up with a better substitute, so generally this article uses 
“527 organizations” as a term referring to a subset of the entire 
universe of 527 political organizations. 
B. IRS Materials 
Because of a general lack of precedential guidance from either 
the IRS or the courts in the area of political activity by exempt 
organizations, nonprofit organizations and their advisors have 
become accustomed to looking to a variety of sources to glean 
information about the proper interpretation of the relevant law.29  
Readers who are not regular practitioners in this area may not be 
familiar with the range of materials cited below, so perhaps a brief 
orientation to the wonderful world of IRS guidance may prove 
useful.30 
In addition to the statutes, regulations, and cases familiar to 
legal practitioners, signposts on the road through federal tax law 
include an array of administrative materials.  These are roughly 
divided into those considered “precedential” and those that are 
not.  All are generated by various offices within the IRS.  
Precedential guidance, for obvious reasons, requires approval by 
more senior level officials at the IRS.  These precedential 
documents represent authoritative interpretations of the law, in the 
sense that the IRS considers itself bound by them and allows 
taxpayers to cite and rely on them in proceedings before the 
Service.  Although they are official agency interpretations due some 
deference, they are not necessarily binding on a court.  This 
 
at http://www.irs.gov/charities/political/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004). 
 29. For a small, grassroots, nonprofit organization, the most important 
question is not what the law actually is, or what the courts would eventually rule 
the law to be, but what interpretation the IRS is likely to apply.  Being right on the 
law is of little solace when the organization has gone out of operation due to 
spending all available resources on protracted litigation.  Hence, knowing how tax 
administrators understand the rules takes on added importance, and any public 
statement that sheds light on this question is of use, even if it is not considered 
precedential. 
 30. Readers interested in a more extensive discussion of the sources of law 
governing tax-exempt organizations are referred to HOPKINS, supra note 11. 
8
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category includes Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures, as 
well as some Announcements and Notices. 
Non-precedential rulings are intended only to resolve a 
problem with regard to a specific individual or entity; they do not 
enunciate rules of general applicability and other taxpayers are not 
entitled to cite them as authority or rely on them as precedent, 
even in identical factual circumstances.31  However, politically active 
tax-exempt organizations travel a route where legal standards have 
been stated very broadly and precedential guidance is rare.32  
Consequently, any hint as to where lines have been drawn (be they 
dotted white or double yellow) is welcomed and scrutinized.  
Private, non-precedential rulings include Private Letter Rulings, 
Technical Advice Memoranda, General Counsel Memoranda, and 
Field Service Advice.33   
Finally, the IRS produces an annual internal instruction 
manual for its Continuing Professional Education (CPE) program.  
Articles published in the CPE text are not binding rulings, even 
with regard to a single taxpayer.  They do, however, provide a 
useful and accessible compilation of relevant law on topics of 
interest.  On occasion, the text may also indicate the thinking of 
IRS experts on unresolved questions, and, at the least, they can 
indicate how agents in the field are being directed to understand 
and apply legal principles. 
III. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY 501(C)(3)S 
Restrictions on political activities by 501(c)(3)s are found not 
only in the explicit language of the statute and its implementing 
regulations,34 but also in an interpretation of another 501(c)(3) 
 
 31. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3). 
 32. See infra note 39. 
 33. One possible rationale for the multiplicity of types of non-precedential 
documents is the ongoing struggle with the IRS by those in the regulated 
community trying to gain some insight into the ways in which the IRS applies the 
law.  The nonprofit publisher of tax-law materials Tax Analysts (and its founder 
Tom Fields) have been diligent in pursuing federal Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests and litigation forcing the IRS to disclose its interpretations of tax 
law.  Paul Streckfus (another champion of greater IRS disclosure) has suggested in 
his EO Tax Journal that to prevent disclosure the IRS changes the name of its 
guidance documents every time Tax Analysts wins another FOIA lawsuit.  See Paul 
Streckfus, Editor’s Notebook, PAUL STRECKFUS’ EO TAX J., Nov. 2000, at 4–5 
(discussion of unfortunate IRS penchant for secrecy subtitled “Why is the IRS 
Going Underground?”).   
 34. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990). 
9
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doctrine—the restriction on use of charitable resources for private 
benefit.  We consider each restriction in turn. 
A. Campaign Intervention Prohibited 
501(c)(3) organizations are subject to an absolute prohibition 
against political campaigning; they may not “participate in, or 
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of 
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition 
to) any candidate for public office.”35  (For shorthand throughout, 
this prohibited 501(c)(3) activity will be termed “campaign 
intervention.”)  The prohibition on 501(c)(3) campaign 
intervention has been interpreted broadly.  Indeed, it has been 
interpreted more broadly than would be permissible for most 
government restrictions on speech because 501(c)(3)s receive what 
is considered a tax subsidy; not only are they exempt from paying 
tax on their own income, but 501(c)(3)s receive tax-deductible 
donations.36  A broad reading of “campaign intervention” is needed 
to avoid giving a taxpayer subsidy to electioneering.37 
In determining whether a 501(c)(3) activity constitutes 
impermissible campaign intervention, the IRS will examine an 
activity based on all the surrounding “facts and circumstances.”38  
The test has not been further articulated in statute or regulation, 
and the courts and the IRS have issued only a very few rulings, even 
fewer of them precedential.  The rulings that have been issued do 
not offer clear road signs, but rather mere examples of 501(c)(3) 
 
 35. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 36. In the same vein, the restrictions on election-related activities by 
501(c)(3)s are greater than those on other tax-exempt organizations because the 
tax subsidy for 501(c)(3)s is more generous than that provided to other 
organizations, which generally do not have tax incentives to offer donors. 
 37. In truth, this is an after-the-fact justification.  As a matter of policy, the 
need to avoid taxpayer-funded subsidies of partisan political activity is a reasonable 
explanation for the prohibition on 501(c)(3) campaign intervention.  The actual 
legislative intent behind adoption of the prohibition is murky, to say the least.  
(For an extensive discussion of the available evidence to suggest Congressional 
motivation, see Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 app. I, at 448–51 [hereinafter 2002 ELECTION YEAR 
ISSUES CPE], available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-tege/topici02.pdf.)  
Nonetheless, the rationalization has become accepted truth.  See infra Part VII.A 
for a more complete discussion of the courts’ analysis of the tax subsidy as 
justification for restricting 501(c)(3) election-related speech. 
 38. 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra, note 37 at 339. 
10
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behavior that is permissible or impermissible.39 
At one extreme, activities that clearly support or oppose candidates 
for office have been found to be in violation of the ban on 
501(c)(3) campaign intervention.  In Christian Echoes Ministries, Inc. 
v. United States, the court upheld the IRS revocation of the exempt 
status of a 501(c)(3) that attacked liberal candidates and endorsed 
conservatives.40  In Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, the court upheld the 
IRS revocation of the 501(c)(3) status of the Church at Pierce 
Creek because the church had run newspaper ads four days before 
the 1992 presidential election urging Christians not to vote for 
then-candidates Bill Clinton and Al Gore.41  Most non-precedential 
guidance from the IRS similarly forbids apparent 501(c)(3) 
support for or opposition to candidates.42 
Likewise, rating candidates is prohibited for 501(c)(3)s, even if 
done in an objective and non-partisan manner.  In Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the 
court upheld the IRS denial of the Bar’s application for 
recognition as a 501(c)(3) organization because the Bar rated 
candidates for non-partisan judicial elections.43 
 
 39. The result is that practitioners called upon to advise 501(c)(3) clients on 
their election-related activities are like drivers forced to intuit the rules of the road 
by observing which drivers the police pull over or what crashes are featured in 
Blood on the Highway (or similar horrific films legendary from decades of drivers’ 
ed. classes).  Many practitioners in this area have expressed their frustration with 
this state of affairs.  See, e.g., Commentary on IRS 1993 Exempt Organization Continuing 
Professional Education Technical Instruction Program Article on ‘Election Year Issues,’ 
prepared by individual members of the Subcommittee on Political and Lobbying 
Activities and Organizations of the Committee on Exempt Organizations of the 
Section on Taxation, American Bar Association (Feb. 21, 1995), reprinted in 11 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 854 (1995).  At least one prominent jurist has criticized IRS 
reliance on a subjective “facts and circumstances” test in another context.  Judge 
Posner, considering IRS use of the “facts and circumstances” standard to evaluate 
appropriate structure of payments for fundraising costs for 501(c)(3)s wrote that 
“‘facts and circumstances’ . . . is no standard at all, and makes the tax status of 
charitable organizations and their donors a matter of the whim of the IRS.”  
United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 40. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 864 (1973).  In 
addition to finding that it had intervened in campaigns, the court found that 
Christian Echoes had engaged in substantial lobbying activities in violation of its 
501(c)(3) status.  Id. 
 41. 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 42. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-09-007 (Mar. 1, 1996) (501(c)(3) intervened 
in election by sending fundraising mailings timed to coincide with an election that 
implied that contributions would help candidates sharing the organization’s 
ideology). 
 43. 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).  See also 
11
Kingsley and Pomeranz: A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
KINGSLEYPOMERANZ- (LS & CB).DOC 10/3/2004  7:38:12 PM 
66 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
On the other hand, charities may engage in nonpartisan voter 
registration and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) activity.  Statute and 
regulations place substantial limits on 501(c)(3) private foundation 
funding for voter registration efforts, but in stating those 
restrictions, the statute makes it implicitly clear that 501(c)(3) 
organizations may conduct voter registration efforts.44  In an effort 
to qualify for foundation funding under these laws, a number of 
charities have sought and received IRS approval for their effort 
through non-precedential Private Letter Rulings.  These rulings 
suggest that 501(c)(3)s conducting voter registration or GOTV 
must target their efforts based on nonpartisan criteria and must 
ensure that the issue-related messages used in these efforts discuss a 
broad range of issues and do not promote a particular view on 
issues dividing the candidates.45 
Two Revenue Rulings examine the area of 501(c)(3) voter 
guides and legislative voting records.46  In 1978, the IRS provided 
four hypothetical examples—one “good” and one “bad”—for each 
of these two types of educational materials related to candidates 
and incumbent legislators.47  For voter guides, the IRS approved of a 
501(c)(3) producing a voter guide based on a questionnaire that 
asked all the candidates running for a particular office to respond 
to questions about their positions on a “wide variety of issues” 
selected “solely on the basis of their importance and interest to the 
 
Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125 (501(c)(3) may not evaluate candidates for 
elective school board and support certain candidates); Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-35-003 
(April 19, 1996) (501(c)(3) may not support program in which panels of citizens 
seek objective information about candidates and the issues and use the 
information to rate the candidates). 
 44. I.R.C. § 4945(f).  See also Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-3 (1972) (listing those 
activities that may constitute “carrying on voter registration drives” for 501(c)(3) 
organizations). 
 45. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-51-029 (Sept. 19, 1997) (approving 501(c)(3) voter 
registration and GOTV program targeting low-income, minority, and young 
women and using voter education materials on a “broad range of issues”); Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 95-40-044 (July 6, 1995) (approving 501(c)(3) voter registration program 
targeting minority women); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-23-050 (Mar. 10, 1992) (approving 
501(c)(3) voter registration program targeting homeless people and using 
messages related to “poverty, housing, health care and crime”); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-
22-080 (Mar. 9, 1988) (approving 501(c)(3) voter registration and GOTV program 
targeting communities with low voter participation); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-22-056 (Mar. 
4, 1988) (approving 501(c)(3) voter registration program targeting “minorities, 
low-income people, recent immigrants, under-educated people, and young 
people”). 
 46. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178. 
 47. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154. 
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electorate as a whole.”48  Neither the questions nor the resulting 
voter guide that the hypothetical 501(c)(3) distributed to the 
general public demonstrated any “bias or preference with respect 
to the views of any candidate.”49  In contrast, a similar voter guide 
based on questions that did evince some bias on the issues was 
deemed impermissible.50 
For legislative voting records, the IRS approved a record of the 
votes of all members of Congress on a “wide variety of subjects” that 
did not suggest the organization’s approval or disapproval of the 
positions taken in those votes.51  A 501(c)(3) produced this record 
annually and made it available to the general public.52  In contrast, 
the IRS rejected a voting record that was distributed during an 
election campaign and that focused only on a narrow range of 
issues that were of interest to the organizational members and 
others to whom the 501(c)(3) distributed the guide.53  Although 
the guide did not expressly support or oppose any candidate, the 
IRS found that “concentrating on a narrow range of issues in the 
voter’s guide and widely distributing it among the electorate during 
an election campaign” made it impermissible 501(c)(3) 
participation in an election.54 
The IRS amplified its position on voting records two years 
later, holding that an organization could distribute, to a small 
number of interested members and others, a voting record that 
focused on select issues of importance to the organization and that 
compared each vote to the organization’s position on the issue.55  
The Ruling emphasized that this members-only voting record was 
not timed to coincide with any election, that it included all 
incumbent legislators without indicating which were running for 
reelection, and that its distribution was not targeted to particular 
legislative districts.56  Furthermore, the guide did not express 
support for or opposition to any candidate and included a 
disclaimer reminding readers not to judge the qualifications of a 
 
 48. Id., Situation 2. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id., Situation 3. 
 51. Id., Situation 1. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id., Situation 4. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178. 
 56. Id. 
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candidate based only on a few votes.57 
In contrast, the IRS has been unwilling to let 501(c)(3)s 
publish lists of candidates who have signed or refused to sign a 
candidate pledge.  In 1976, the IRS formally approved a 501(c)(3)’s 
distribution to candidates of a code of fair campaign practices that 
the 501(c)(3) did not ask candidates to endorse.58  Indeed, the 1976 
ruling overturned a Revenue Ruling from 1966 that had permitted 
501(c)(3)s to affirmatively seek just such a candidate pledge to 
support a code of fair campaign practices.59  The IRS held that 
asking candidates to endorse the code “constitutes intervention in a 
political campaign and may result, through the publication or 
release of the names of candidates who sign or endorse or who 
refuse to sign or endorse the code, in influencing voter opinion.”60 
Candidate debates or forums sponsored by 501(c)(3) 
organizations have been the subject of multiple Revenue Rulings.  
The most complete exposition of the IRS position came in 1986, 
when the IRS held that the following described a forum conducted 
“in a neutral manner:”61 
 
All legally qualified . . . candidates [for a particular 
elected office] will be invited to participate in the forum.62 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2 C.B. 151 (modifying and superseding Rev. Rul. 
66-258, 1966-2 C.B. 213 for taxable years beginning after 1976). 
 59. See id.  
 60. Gen Couns. Mem. 36,557 (Jan. 19, 1976). The full story of these two 
Revenue Rulings, Rev. Rul. 76–456 and Rev. Rul. 66–258, as described in the non-
precedential General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 36,557, makes the reasons 
for this IRS reversal clear.  See id.  The activities of the same organization were the 
motivation for both the 1966 and the 1976 Revenue Rulings.  When the 1966 
ruling was issued, the organization had assured the IRS that although it would ask 
candidates to endorse its code of campaign practices it would not publicize the 
results.  Id.  When the organization nonetheless publicized the pledges, the IRS 
General Counsel’s office recommended a new ruling to forbid even solicitation of 
candidate pledges because publication (which the Counsel saw as having the 
potential to influence an election) was “but a logical extension of the solicitation 
process.”  Id.  The result was Revenue Ruling 76-456, which, in its final form, was 
modified from the more restrictive draft proposed in the GCM in that it 
affirmatively permitted at least the distribution of such a candidate pledge by a 
501(c)(3). See id.; Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2 C.B. 151. The authors, as well as other 
practitioners with whom we have discussed the matter, believe that the 1976 ruling 
was an over-reaction by the IRS, and that, in spite of the 1976 ruling, a 501(c)(3) 
would likely win any dispute with the IRS if the organization asked candidates to 
sign a pledge but did not publish the results. 
 61. Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73. 
 62. With regard to the necessity of inviting all candidates to participate, the 
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The questions will be prepared and presented by a 
nonpartisan, independent panel. The topics discussed will 
cover a broad range of issues of interest to the public, 
notwithstanding that the issues discussed may include 
issues of particular importance to the organization’s 
members. Each candidate will receive an equal 
opportunity to present his or her views on each of the 
issues discussed. Finally, the moderator selected by the 
organization will not comment on the questions or 
otherwise make comments that imply approval or 
disapproval of any of the candidates.63 
 
Several rulings also allow 501(c)(3)s to make certain charitable 
resources available to candidates if the resources are made available 
to all candidates on an equal basis.  The IRS held that 501(c)(3) 
universities could support a campus newspaper that featured 
student-written editorials favoring particular candidates, and any 
political science classes that require students to participate in a 
political campaign (selected by the student).64  The IRS has also 
held that 501(c)(3)s operating broadcast stations may provide 
candidates with free air time on an equal basis in compliance with 
then-current federal communications law.65 
These rulings provide examples of how the IRS applies the 
“facts and circumstances” test and illuminate key “facts” or 
“circumstances,” such as the content and timing of any message, 
the intended audience for any message, the organization’s history 
of engaging in similar activities, and many other factors.  A number 
of rulings emphasize the importance of including a “broad range of 
issues” in any 501(c)(3) voter education or other election-related 
activities and communications.  The rationale seems to be that a 
selective focus on only one or a few issues creates a greater 
possibility that the allegedly non-partisan activity will be 
 
courts have allowed 501(c)(3)s to exclude certain candidates with little practical 
chance of winning the election if the charity sets objective qualifications for 
participation and applies them to all candidates.  See Fulani v. League of Women 
Voters, 684 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(permitting charity to exclude candidate who failed to meet such a threshold test). 
 63. Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73 (amplifying Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 
210, holding that a 501(c)(3) organization may conduct debates on political 
matters). 
 64. Rev. Rul. 72-513, 1972-2 C.B. 246 (regarding a student run newspaper); 
Rev. Rul. 72-512, 1972-2 C.B. 246 (regarding political science courses). 
 65. Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 160. 
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manipulated to promote one candidate over another. 
Although existing precedential guidance strictly limits the 
election-related activities of 501(c)(3)s, a couple of private rulings 
do appear to sanction behavior that most advisors in this field 
would counsel against.  In a Technical Advice Memorandum 
(TAM), the IRS Chief Counsel’s office reluctantly concluded that a 
charity had not intervened in the 1984 presidential election, even 
though it ran issue ads near the time of the October 1984 debates 
between candidates Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale that 
would generally be understood “to support or oppose a 
candidate.”66  A more recent example is a TAM issued to the 
Progress and Freedom Foundation (PFF).67  PFF’s activities 
included sponsorship of a course taught by Congressman Newt 
Gingrich entitled “Renewing American Civilization.”  After a 
lengthy, careful analysis of extremely complex facts, the IRS 
concluded that the organization, a 501(c)(3), had not violated the 
campaign intervention prohibition.68  It was clear that individuals 
involved intended to subsequently use themes and ideas developed 
in the course for partisan purposes, but it was difficult to impute 
that intent to the entire organization.  In light of the approach we 
will see in the Empower America ruling, discussed in Part IV.D.2, it 
is interesting to note that the IRS conceded that “conservative” did 
not equate to “Republican” in the PFF ruling.69 
 
 66. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-36-002 (Sept. 8, 1989). 
 67. The TAM was unpublished, but its full text was made available by the 
organization.  I.R.S., Tech. Adv. Mem. (Dec. 1, 1998), in 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 
24-25 (Feb. 5, 1999).   
 68. Id. The ruling also concluded that the organization did not operate to 
substantially further private partisan interests.  The TAM distinguished American 
Campaign Academy v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989), on several grounds:  the PFF 
course was not a direct outgrowth of an official party organization’s activities; its 
funding sources were not partisan; there was no evidence of political bias in 
admission of students because the course was offered through established colleges; 
and the material in the course was not explicitly biased towards a party. 
 69. Another 501(c)(3) organization involved in activities related to PFF, the 
Abraham Lincoln Opportunity Foundation (ALOF), lost its exemption prior to 
the PFF ruling.  Announcement 99-45, 1999-1 C.B. 927.  Because ALOF had 
already been dissolved by the time the IRS ruled for PFF, ALOF lacked standing to 
challenge its own revocation.  Abraham Lincoln Opportunity Found. v. Comm’r, 
2000 WL 1161109 (T.C. 2000).  For a time the matter remained as another non-
precedential application of the facts and circumstances test leading to revocation 
of an organization’s 501(c)(3) status.  However, in an unusual move, the IRS 
agreed to reopen the ALOF matter through its “independent review process”—a 
newly created and previously little-known process the IRS created to review 
difficult cases.  See Statement of Callaway Foundations on IRS’s Reversal of Exemption 
16
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Both of these cases represent situations where the IRS’s failure 
to find campaign intervention and impose sanctions has drawn 
criticism from commentators.  Given the Service’s extreme 
reluctance to issue any precedential rulings that could be taken to 
encourage “indirect” or surreptitious campaign intervention, it 
seems likely that these two cases stand simply as illustrations of the 
difficulties of administering the ambiguous “facts and 
circumstances” test.  A determined organization with sufficient 
time and resources to bring to the fight may be able to forestall 
negative IRS action after a protracted battle.  However, this does 
not indicate that organizations that seek to follow the legal rules, or 
that lack the resources to engage in a lengthy legal battle, can 
engage in similar activities with impunity. 
B. 501(c)(3) Election-Related Activities as Private Benefit 
Campaign intervention seems to require one or more 
candidates involved in a specific election, but it is also problematic 
for a 501(c)(3) to promote partisan interests more generally.70  The 
seminal case applying the private benefit doctrine to the 
advancement of partisan interests is American Campaign Academy v. 
Commissioner.71  The American Campaign Academy was formed to 
train campaign workers, which was previously part of the function 
conducted by the National Republican Congressional Committee 
(NRCC).72  Although the Academy had no explicit requirements 
regarding students’ party affiliation, there was evidence suggesting 
a Republican slant on the admissions panel as a matter of 
 
Revocation, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 94-59 (May 15, 2003) (noting that Internal 
Revenue Manual § 1.54.1 regulations published Jan. 2002 rebut allegations that 
the process was secret).  Upon review, the IRS retroactively restored ALOF’s 
501(c)(3) status.  See I.R.S. Announcement 2003-30, 2003-1 C.B. 929.  The ALOF 
review, and the process by which it was conducted, led to a great deal of 
controversy, and the IRS soon after ended its independent review process.  See 
Fred Stokeld, IRS Abandons Process that Restored Exemptions to Gingrich Groups, 42 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 339 (2003). 
 70. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). There is not, of course, any requirement 
that candidates be specifically identified.  For example, urging voters to “vote pro-
choice” would likely be considered to promote the election of candidates widely 
understood to be pro-choice, even if the organization’s message did not identify 
particular candidates.  Furthermore, it appears that attempts to provide benefits to 
political parties or PACs will also violate the campaign intervention prohibition as 
a form of indirect intervention for or against the candidates supported or opposed 
by the party or committee. 
 71. 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). 
 72. Id. at 1053. 
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practice.73  Other evidence and inferences indicated that most if 
not all of the Academy’s graduates went to work for Republican 
candidates.74  The instructional program was conceded to be 
legitimately educational, but portions of the curriculum indicated 
an explicit bias towards Republican interests, with no 
corresponding examination of Democratic materials.75  Finally, the 
organization’s primary source of funding was the NRCC.76 
Based on these facts, the court concluded that the IRS had 
correctly determined that the Academy did not qualify as a 
501(c)(3) because it operated substantially to further the private 
interests of Republican entities and candidates.77  The idea that a 
legitimate educational program could be conducted so as to 
impermissibly advance private interests was not novel.78  American 
Campaign Academy established that the interests of partisan entities 
constitute private interests.79 
IV. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY 501(C)(4)S 
A. Primary Social Welfare Purpose Excludes Political Activities 
Organizations operating under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) may engage 
in certain election-related activities too partisan for 501(c)(3)s, but 
there are limits imposed by the 501(c)(4)’s tax-exempt status.80 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) describes organizations “operated 
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.”81  Somewhat 
counter to what one might expect, “operated exclusively” has been 
interpreted in the associated regulations to mean that the 
organization “is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the 
 
 73. Id. at 1056. 
 74. Id. at 1060. 
 75. Id. at 1070–71. 
 76. Id. at 1070. 
 77. Id. at 1078–79. 
 78. This point was noted in an extended discussion of this case published in 
the 2002 Continuing Professional Education text.  2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, 
supra note 37 app. II, at 452. 
 79. Am. Campaign Academy, 92 T.C. at 1077–79.  The court declined to 
consider whether Republican entities and candidates could constitute a charitable 
class that would be the appropriate recipient of 501(c)(3) benefits, despite the 
large size of the class.  Id. The partisan affiliation indicated that the interests 
defining the class were private.  Id. 
 80. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)–(4). 
 81. Id. § 501(c)(4). 
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common good and general welfare of the people of the 
community.”82  The regulations further provide that “the 
promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect 
participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or 
in opposition to any candidate for public office.”83  For the sake of 
convenience, this activity that may not be primary for a 501(c)(4) 
will be referred to as “political activity.” 
Revenue Ruling 81-95 states affirmatively what is implied in the 
501(c)(4) regulations:  that 501(c)(4)s may engage in political 
activity so long as they primarily conduct social welfare activities.84 
The organization in question carried on what was characterized as 
“certain activities involving participation and intervention in 
political campaigns.”  Apparently these activities were fairly direct: 
“financial assistance and in-kind services.”  The ruling stated as a 
fact that the organization was primarily engaged in activities 
designed to promote social welfare.  Thus, its legal conclusion was 
reached quickly:  “[A]n organization may carry on lawful political 
activities and remain exempt under § 501(c)(4) as long as it is 
 
 82. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis 
added). 
 83. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). Unfortunately, no publicly available 
regulatory history sheds any light on the rationale underlying adoption of the IRS 
interpretation that social welfare activities do not include political activity.  Such 
an explanation could be extraordinarily useful to organizations and their advisors 
attempting to understand and comply with the limitation on 501(c)(4) political 
activity.  However, as noted in a recent IRS instructional article, a 1969 General 
Counsel’s Memorandum reached a similar conclusion with regard to 501(c)(5) 
and (c)(6) organizations, reasoning that while the content of legislation may be 
readily identified with the organization’s exempt labor or business purposes, 
“support of a candidate for public office necessarily involves the organization in 
the total political attitudes and positions of the candidate.”  Gen. Couns. Mem. 
34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969), quoted in 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE supra note 37, at 
433.  The CPE article suggests that, “This rationale would appear to apply to other 
types of exempt organizations.”  Id. at 433.  In other words, 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5) 
and 501(c)(6) organizations may lobby to an unlimited extent on issues germane 
to their exempt purposes, but because supporting a candidate furthers positions 
entirely unrelated to those purposes, such activities are not part of those in which 
the organization must primarily be engaged. 
  Note that if this is indeed the rationale for the restriction on 501(c)(4) 
political activity, it arguably does not support extending the definition as far as the 
reach of the prohibition on 501(c)(3) campaign intervention.  For instance, voter 
education activities that focus on social welfare issues might reasonably be argued 
to be “germane” to a 501(c)(4)’s purpose of promoting a position on those issues, 
yet because the materials suggest a preference for candidates that share the 
organization’s view on the issues they would be impermissible for a 501(c)(3) to 
produce or distribute. 
 84. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. 
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primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare.”85 
What the regulations and rulings for 501(c)(4)s do not tell us 
is precisely what constitutes political activity.  Existing authority is 
both scant and contradictory, and the IRS appears to have adopted 
a “facts and circumstances” approach similar to the analysis used to 
determine when an activity constitutes campaign intervention for a 
501(c)(3).86  In addition, the uncertainty for 501(c)(4)s is 
compounded by the lack of a clear standard to determine what 
activities an organization is “primarily engaged in.”  Rather, the IRS 
has held that “[a]ll facts and circumstances are taken into account 
in determining an [501(c)(4)] organization’s primary activity.”87  
An only slightly more detailed description appeared in a 1995 CPE 
article: 
 
Whether an organization is “primarily engaged” in 
promoting social welfare is a “facts and circumstances” 
determination.  Relevant factors include the amount of 
funds received from and devoted to particular activities; 
other resources used in conducting such activities, such as 
buildings and equipment; the time devoted to activities 
(by volunteers as well as employees); the manner in which 
the organization’s activities are conducted; and the 
purposes furthered by various activities.88 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Raymond Chick & Amy Henchey, Political Organizations and IRC 
501(c)(4), EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995, 192, 197-98 (1995) 
[hereinafter 1995 501(C)(4) POLITICAL CPE] available at http://www.irs. 
ustreas.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicm95.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (“IRC 
501(c)(4) does not define political campaign activities; instead, the definition and 
interpretation of terms used has occurred principally under IRC 501(c)(3). . . .  
[W]hether an organization has participated or intervened in a political campaign 
is a ‘facts and circumstances’ test.”).   
 87. Rev. Rul. 68-45, 1968-1 C.B. 259. 
 88. 1995 501(C)(4) POLITICAL CPE, supra note 86, at 192. 
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B. 501(c)(4) “Political Activity” as 501(c)(3) “Campaign Intervention” 
1. Precedential Authority Suggesting Congruence of 501(c)(4) 
Political Activity and 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention 
As discussed above, organizations operating under § 501(c)(3) 
may not “participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign 
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office,”89 
language clearly echoed in the 501(c)(4) regulations that set out 
activity that may not be primary for a 501(c)(4).  It is highly likely 
that the intent in drafting the 501(c)(4) regulatory language was to 
mirror the set of activities that constitute campaign intervention 
under § 501(c)(3).  This interpretation is consistent with principles 
of statutory interpretation—that absent evidence to the contrary, 
one should read similar language to mean similar things. 
It is notable that implementing regulations under § 501(c)(3) 
expressly state the interpretation that the campaign intervention 
prohibition is limited to candidates for “elective public office.”90  
No authority expressly limits the scope of 501(c)(4) political 
activity to campaigns for elective office.  However, the 501(c)(3) 
regulations did not purport to be imposing an additional limitation 
that would narrow the statutory prohibition.  Rather, they set forth 
a clarifying reading.  The phrase “political campaign” is generally 
understood to refer to elections.  It is reasonable to read the 
language of the 501(c)(4) regulations similarly, so that 501(c)(4) 
political activity would relate only to campaigns for elected public 
office.91 
Only one precedential ruling addresses a specific activity that 
was found to be political, and therefore not permissible as the 
primary activity of a 501(c)(4).  Revenue Ruling 67-368 says that 
rating candidates, even on a nonpartisan basis, is political activity 
that may not be primary for a 501(c)(4).92  This is consistent with 
finding 501(c)(3) campaign intervention and 501(c)(4) political 
activity to be the same thing, given that, as noted above, other 
 
 89. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 90. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990). 
 91. Other advocacy relating to non-elected public office (e.g. appointed 
judges), or elected non-public offices (e.g. corporate officers), would not be 
covered in the definition of 501(c)(4) political activity and presumably would be 
acceptable as promotion of social welfare, so long as it was linked to the 
organization’s social welfare purposes. 
 92. Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194. 
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rulings have found that such activity would constitute 
impermissible campaign intervention if conducted by a 501(c)(3).93  
Thus, this Revenue Ruling suggests, but does not necessarily 
require, that 501(c)(4) political activity is described by the same set 
of activities as 501(c)(3) campaign intervention. 
In reaching its conclusion that 501(c)(4)s may engage in 
political activities, Revenue Ruling 81-95 cites Revenue Ruling 67-
368 and, in passing, existing 501(c)(3) rulings for other examples 
of what constitutes campaign intervention.94  Thus, although it is 
not necessary to the conclusion of the ruling, Revenue Ruling 81-95 
demonstrates an assumption that anything that constitutes 
prohibited 501(c)(3) campaign intervention will be 501(c)(4) 
political activity. 
It has been widely assumed that, whatever the definition of 
501(c)(4) “political activity” includes that is not the promotion of 
social welfare, it cannot logically include a broader set of activities 
than is covered by 501(c)(3) campaign intervention.  There is no 
authority suggesting that something might constitute political 
activity for a 501(c)(4) and yet not be campaign intervention for a 
501(c)(3), and there is no apparent policy reason to impose any 
such rule.95  Charitable activities (i.e., permissible for a 501(c)(3)) 
certainly promote social welfare; although social welfare is likely a 
broader concept, covering activities and purposes other than the 
charitable as well.96  Hence, political activity that may not be 
primary for a 501(c)(4) does not logically include any activities 
permissible for a charitable organization under 501(c)(3). 
 
 93. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of New York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
 94. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981 C.B. 332. 
 95. This assumption is supported by the language of the regulations 
concerning “action” organizations.  One thing that triggers “action organization” 
status is political campaign intervention.  The regulations state that such an 
organization may not qualify under § 501(c)(3), but “may nevertheless qualify as a 
social welfare organization under 501(c)(4).”  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(v) 
(as amended in 1990). 
 96. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (including the promotion of social welfare in 
the definition of charitable purposes); John Francis Reilly et al., IRC 501(c)(4) 
Organizations, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 
2003, I-25 [hereinafter 2003 501(C)(4) CPE], at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopici03.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (“[T]here is considerable overlap 
between IRC 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(3).  Many organizations could qualify for 
exempt status under either Code section.”). 
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2. Non-precedential Support for 501(c)(3)-501(c)(4) Congruence 
Other published IRS interpretations are consistent with a 
conclusion that 501(c)(4) political activity under the primary 
purpose test is coterminous with prohibited 501(c)(3) campaign 
intervention.  The 2002 CPE text discusses the primary test for 
501(c)(4)s and cites these authorities.97  The article does say that a 
501(c) organization may make expenditures for political activities 
or other things that do not further its exempt purpose so long as 
they are not the primary activity.98  Neither that discussion nor the 
article on political activity by 501(c) organizations in the 2003 CPE 
provides further insight into whether 501(c)(4) political activity is 
defined by the same standard that determines 501(c)(3) campaign 
intervention.99 
A series of letter rulings in the late 1990s include express 
statements by the IRS that the set of activities which are prohibited 
campaign intervention for 501(c)(3)s are the same activities that 
constitute political activity, which must not be the primary activity 
of a 501(c)(4).  The rulings arose in the context of taxpayers 
seeking a determination that certain activities were exempt function 
activity under § 527, and will be discussed in further detail below.  
However, because of the way the request was framed, it was easy to 
conclude that the proposed activities would be campaign 
intervention for a 501(c)(3).  The first of these rulings looked at 
Revenue Ruling 81-95 and made explicit what was implicit in its 
reasoning:  that prohibited 501(c)(3) campaign intervention is the 
same thing as activity that must be less than primary for a 
501(c)(4).100  Subsequent Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) repeated 
this reasoning in sketching out the scope of 527 exempt function 
activity.  Thus, they provide strong evidence that the IRS interprets 
501(c)(4) political activity as described above: the same activities 
that constitute prohibited campaign intervention under § 
501(c)(3) are those that are considered political activity under § 
501(c)(4) and may not be a 501(c)(4) organization’s primary 
 
 97. 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra note 37, at 433. 
 98. Id. 
 99. John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and 
Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003 [hereinafter 2003 
POLITICAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES CPE], at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ 
eotopicl03.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004). 
 100. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996). 
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activity. 
501(c)(4)s seeking to engage in political activity are faced with 
a multitude of uncertainties.  The lack of clear guidance about the 
precise scope of the 501(c)(3) campaign intervention prohibition, 
and the nebulous “facts and circumstances” test used to analyze a 
given activity is compounded by the application of another “facts 
and circumstances” analysis to determine whether an organization 
is “primarily” engaged in social welfare activities.  501(c)(4)s 
interested in participating in public debate around both elections 
and policy issues have little useful guidance to apply in deciding 
what to measure and how to weigh it in trying to ensure their 
primary activities promote social welfare.101 
D. Private Benefit and 501(c)(4)s 
No precedential authority has followed the American Campaign 
Academy case (discussed above) to restrict 501(c)(4) political 
activities.102  However, several rulings make it clear that the primary 
social welfare purpose of a 501(c)(4) must be met by a community 
benefit rather than a private benefit, and these rulings directly 
connect this concept of private benefit to the private benefit 
forbidden as a substantial purpose of 501(c)(3)s. The difference is 
quantitative, not qualitative—less than “primary” for 501(c)(4)s 
versus “substantial” for 501(c)(3)s.103 
1. Primary Purpose Versus Private Benefit 
An organization will be considered “operated exclusively for 
the promotion of social welfare [under 501(c)(4)] if it is primarily 
engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general 
welfare of the . . . community.”104  Numerous cases and rulings 
contrast the requirement that a 501(c)(4) operate primarily for the 
common good and provide community benefit with the provision 
of private benefit, which may not be the primary function of a 
501(c)(4) social welfare organization.105 
 
 101. See Final Report of the Members of the Exempt Organizations Committee’s Task 
Force on Section 501(c)(4) and Politics, reprinted in 45 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 136 
(2004) (noting lack of precedential guidance). 
 102. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 103. See I.R.C. § 501(c). 
 104. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990).   
 105. The following discussion touches on a few rulings in order to illustrate 
the parameters of the 501(c)(4) private benefit standard.  A lengthier summary of 
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Otherwise exempt activities and purposes may be tainted if the 
organization’s benefits are confined to or targeted towards a 
limited class of members.  Thus, an organization formed to 
promote the common interests of tenants in an apartment complex 
does not operate primarily for the common good and general 
welfare of the community, but rather for the private benefit of the 
residents.106  In contrast, an organization undertaking similar 
advocacy activities was found to qualify as a 501(c)(4) because it 
“promote[d] the legal rights of all tenants in a particular 
community.”107 
501(c)(4)s may provide greater private benefit than 501(c)(3)s 
and still retain exemption.  A 501(c)(3) must not engage in any 
non-exempt activity unless it can be considered “insubstantial,”108 
but a 501(c)(4) need only ensure that activities not in furtherance 
of social welfare are less than primary.  The distinction is illustrated 
by an organization whose membership was restricted to residents, 
property owners, and businesses located in a single city block.109 It 
was formed to preserve and beautify the public areas of that block; 
activities included planting shrubbery, picking up litter, and paying 
the city to plant trees.110  Although the private benefit to members 
was too great to allow exemption under § 501(c)(3), the 
community benefit was found to be sufficient for exemption under 
§ 501(c)(4).111 
2. Private Benefit to Partisan Interests 
While it has never issued a precedential ruling applying the 
concept of 501(c)(4) private benefit in the political context, the 
IRS expressly raised the possibility in a proposed denial letter 
issued to Empower America, which had applied for recognition as a 
501(c)(4): “The private benefit standard used in American Campaign 
Academy is similar under § 501(c)(4).  The difference is in the 
 
precedents addressing community versus private benefit is found in 2003 
501(C)(4) CPE, supra note 96. 
 106. Rev. Rul. 73-306, 1973-2 C.B. 179. 
 107. Rev. Rul. 80-206, 1980-2 C.B. 185. 
 108. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C. v.  United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 
(1945). 
 109. Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  Cf. Rev. Rul. 68-14, 1968-1 C.B. 243 (stating that an organization 
formed to beautify and plant trees in an entire city is operated for charitable 
purposes and qualifies for exemption under § 501(c)(3)). 
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weighing of the private benefits (i.e., the amount of private 
benefits), not the standard.”112 
The Empower America application illustrates an attempt by 
the IRS to deny exemption based on a determination that the 
applicant was a “partisan issues organization” and hence primarily 
operated for private benefit.113  The organization was founded by 
several prominent Republicans with the purpose of advancing a 
conservative reform agenda.114  Its activities included publishing 
various materials on public policy issues, holding conferences and 
seminars, grass roots lobbying, and conducting “candidate 
schools.”115 
In a proposed denial letter, the IRS asserted that Empower 
America did not primarily promote social welfare because it was 
“partisan.”116  To support this conclusion, the IRS set out a long list 
of factors that it considered indicated partisan operations.117  These 
included that the organization was controlled by individuals 
affiliated with the Republican party; repeated criticism of the 
Clinton Administration and its policies such that (it was alleged), 
“Clinton Administration” became a negative code word for the 
Democratic party; seminars covering topics similar to Republican 
policies; and public communications characterized as “partisan” 
because of their use of code words and ideas associated with the 
Republican party.118 A similar, yet distinct, concern raised was that 
the organization operated to further the private benefit of its 
directors by maintaining their political prominence.119 
Empower America responded forcefully, disputing the factual 
basis for the IRS’s conclusion that it was a “partisan issues 
organization.”120  Its reply cited numerous instances of speaking out 
on non-political issues (concerns about the degradation of 
American popular culture), working together with Democratic 
affiliated organizations, criticizing Republicans and opposing 
 
 112. Letter from Edward K. Karcher, Chief of Exempt Organizations Technical 
Branch 3, to Empower America (Feb. 21, 1997), reprinted in PAUL STRECKFUS'S EO 
TAX J., Dec. 22, 1997, at 28, 34. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 28.   
 115. Id. at 28–29.   
 116. Id. at 34.   
 117. Id. at 33.   
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 34.   
 120. Letter of Empower America to Edward K. Karcher, (April 21, 1997), 
reprinted in id. at 35.   
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positions forwarded by some Republican leaders, and working 
actively to promote a position of the Clinton Administration 
(passage of NAFTA).121  In sum, Empower America effectively took 
issue with the suggestion that “conservative” was a code word for 
“Republican.” 
The organization eventually received a favorable 
determination letter based on the adoption of several procedural 
safeguards to reassure the IRS that it would not operate for private 
benefit.122  These safeguards included not soliciting or knowingly 
accepting funds from Republican entities, requiring any director 
who is seeking elective office to take a leave of absence, and 
continuing to have the issues it focused on be selected by the Board 
based on their importance to the nation and not in coordination 
with any other organization.123 
The story of Empower America highlights the possibility of 
applying the partisan benefit theory to deny exemption, but also 
illustrates the difficulty involved.  In all but the most extreme cases, 
an organization that is not merely an arm or outgrowth of a 
political party will be able to point to differences with partisan 
entities sufficient to undermine a partisan private benefit 
argument.  While conservative interests may have significant 
overlap with policies and priorities of the Republican Party, that 
alone is not sufficient to find that promoting a conservative agenda 
confers impermissible private benefit on partisan Republican 
interests. 
V. POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY 527S 
To read the mainstream press, one would think that political 
organizations operating under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code 
were a new creation invented by nefarious political operatives 
intent on undermining the campaign finance system.  In fact, 
Congress passed § 527 in 1975.124  What is “new” about 527s is that, 
 
 121. Id. at 36–44.   
 122. 1997 TAX NOTES TODAY 231-15 (Dec. 2, 1997). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Congress passed I.R.C. § 527 to address a concern raised by the IRS.  
Until that time, no section of the I.R.C. explicitly exempted political parties, 
candidate campaign organizations, and political committees from taxation on the 
funds they received.  2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra note 37, at 387.  In 
light of this legislative silence, the IRS proposed a solution in 1973 to exempt 
contributions to political organizations from taxation but to subject their 
investment income to taxation.  Announcement 73-84, 1973-33 I.R.B. 18, restated 
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beginning in the late 1990s, there was increased recognition that 
527s could be created to engage in activities that met the 
requirements of § 527 but that were not sufficiently political to be 
regulated by federal, state, or local election authorities.  These new 
“soft” 527s (so-named because their fundraising for political 
purposes was not limited to the “hard money” restrictions of 
election law) offered certain strategic advantages under tax and 
election law, but the growth of the “soft” 527s almost immediately 
resulted in increased regulation.125 
A. “Exempt Function” Under § 527 
I.R.C. § 527 governs taxation of “political” organizations, 
defined as organizations “organized and operated primarily for the 
purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making 
expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.”126  “Exempt 
function,” in turn 
 
means the function of influencing or attempting to 
influence the selection, nomination, election, or 
appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or 
local public office or office in a political organization, or 
the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors, 
whether or not such individual or electors are selected, 
 
in Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14 (modified and clarified in Rev. Rul. 74-475, 1974-
2 C.B. 22).  However, the IRS indicated that it would not enforce this policy until 
Congress had time to consider this issue.  Congress acted by passing § 527. 
 125. Rosemary E. Fei, The Uses of Section 527 Political Organizations, in 1 
STRUCTURING THE INQUIRY INTO ADVOCACY 23 (Elizabeth J. Reid ed., 2000) at 
http://www.urban.org/advocacyresearch/structuring.html (last visited Oct. 3, 
2004). 
 126. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).  Although technically organizations must merely be 
“primarily” engaged in exempt function activities to be tax-exempt under § 527, 
the practical standard may be higher.  Many, perhaps most, 527 organizations are 
actually segregated funds of other organizations.  Thus, a 501(c)(4) might 
establish a fund for political activities, which the IRS will treat as a 527 
organization.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.527–2(b)(1) (as amended in 1985).  However, if 
a segregated fund spends more than an “insubstantial” amount in a year for non-
exempt activities, the IRS will not recognize the fund as a separate 527 
organization.  Id.  Substantial expenditures for non-exempt activities over multiple 
years may result in the IRS treating the fund as if it had never been exempt from 
tax under § 527.  Id.  Thus, the would-be 527 might find itself in tax-exempt 
limbo—unable to qualify as tax-exempt under § 527 because it engaged in 
“substantial” non-exempt activities, yet unable to qualify as tax-exempt under any 
section of 501(c) because its “primary” purpose is still political activities.  The tax 
status of such in-between organizations is far from clear. 
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nominated, elected, or appointed.127 
 
By referring to these activities as “exempt functions,” § 527 
creates a great deal of confusion because, as is clear from the 
discussion of 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) political activities above, 
527’s “exempt function” describes as “exempt” political activities 
that are prohibited or limited for most types of tax-exempt 
organizations.  Organizations primarily engaged in these political 
“exempt functions,” including not only political committees, but 
also political parties and candidate campaigns, pay federal income 
tax on any investment income but not on contributions they 
receive.  Furthermore, contributions to 527 organizations are 
exempt from the federal gift tax usually imposed on donors that 
make gifts in excess of an indexed annual threshold (currently 
$11,000).128 
Not only does the I.R.C. definition of political “exempt 
function” determine which organizations qualify for this tax 
treatment under § 527, but it also determines which activities of 
other organizations are subject to tax on political activities under § 
527(f).  Section 527(f) subjects 501(c) organizations to federal 
income tax on an amount equal to the lesser of expenditures they 
make for “exempt functions” defined under § 527(e)(2) and the 
amount of investment income the 501(c) organization has received 
in that year. 
Various IRS rulings indicate a broad interpretation of this 
standard to apply to most expenditures related to the campaign 
process.  For instance, expenditures for an election night party 
were ruled to be exempt function expenditures as “an inherent 
part of . . . the selection process” even though such expenditures 
clearly would not be able to influence the actual outcome of the 
election and as such could also be permissible for a 501(c)(3) 
organization.129  “Testing the waters” or exploratory costs have been 
ruled to qualify as exempt function expenditures even when the 
individual ultimately did not run for the office contemplated.130 
 
 127. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2). 
 128. Id. § 2501(a)(5). 
 129. Rev. Rul. 87-119, 1987-2 C.B. 151, Q&A 1. 
 130. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-20-002 (May 21, 1993). 
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1. Similarities in the Tests 
No explicit precedential authority addresses the connection 
between “exempt function,” “campaign intervention,” and 
“political activity,” but a series of Private Letter Rulings in the late 
1990s contained reasoning based on the idea that the standards are 
largely, if not entirely, equivalent. 
The first of the rulings examining the outer limits of 527 
exempt function activity appeared in 1996.131  It concerned a 
501(c)(4) organization that had set up a separate segregated fund 
(SSF) to conduct certain activities and sought a ruling that those 
activities would constitute a 527 exempt function and that the SSF 
would be treated as a 527 organization under § 527(f)(3).132  The 
proposed purpose of the fund was to conduct a voter education 
program to raise awareness of the importance of certain issues and 
the position of candidates on those issues without engaging in 
express advocacy for or against any identified candidates.133  
Although few specific facts remain in the heavily redacted ruling, it 
appears that the program would not follow the guidelines set out in 
existing guidance on permissible 501(c)(3) voter education.  
Issues, for instance, were to be selected not because of “their 
importance and interest to the electorate as a whole,”134 but “based 
on their importance to [the organization]’s agenda and their 
expected resonance with the public.”135  Selected issues and themes 
would be “linked to the . . . records and positions of incumbents 
and candidates in order to reinforce the significance of those 
connections in the minds of the voters.”136  Voter guides would 
report candidates’ positions on issues as well as major campaign 
contributors.  Distribution would be targeted geographically based 
on the organization’s political interests and timed to coincide with 
political campaigns.137  Both voter guides and incumbent voting 
 
 131. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Engaging in express advocacy would bring the program within the ambit 
of the campaign finance laws whose contribution limits and disclosure obligations 
the organization was attempting to avoid.  See I.R.C. § 527(f)(3). 
 134. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154, at Situation 2. 
 135. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996). 
 136. Id. 
 137. This last factor is frequently cited as an important consideration in 
determining that an activity constitutes 501(c)(3) campaign intervention.  It is 
obviously relevant in analyzing materials that are purportedly not related to 
elections, such as lobbying messages.  The significance of timing is less apparent 
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records would be designed to indicate the organization’s stance on 
the issues covered and to implicitly compare that position to the 
views of the candidates and legislators covered. 
Other than the statute and regulations, there was no 
precedential authority on which to base an analysis of whether 
these activities constituted a 527 exempt function.  The IRS agreed 
with the taxpayer that this program did not come within the areas 
of permitted voter education set out in existing 501(c)(3) rulings.138  
It clearly fell on the political side of the campaign intervention line.  
It was therefore reasonable to conclude it was exempt function 
activity, that is, “influencing or attempting to influence the . . . 
election . . . of any individual to any . . . public office.”139 
The ruling then looked at Revenue Ruling 81-95 and 
concluded explicitly what was strongly implied in that prior ruling:  
that prohibited 501(c)(3) campaign intervention is the same thing 
as 501(c)(4) political activity.  The ruling went on to say that those 
same activities “are, in turn, activities that are exempt functions for 
a section 527 organization.”140  Certainly, regulations under § 527 
do state that whether an activity constitutes an exempt function 
depends on all the facts and circumstances.141  It is only in this last 
logical step of the ruling, for which no other authority was cited, 
that the IRS indicated that the same “facts and circumstances” that 
determine 501(c)(3) campaign intervention also define the extent 
of the 527 exempt function. 
Subsequent rulings have taken this analysis further in finding 
that specific activities constituted a 527 exempt function.  Letters 
issued in 1997 and 1998 addressed what was termed “dual-character 
activities.”142  These were grass roots lobbying messages that served 
both legislative and political purposes.  The rulings stated that this 
activity, although not exclusively directed towards influencing 
elections, was nonetheless permissible for a 527 fund because it 
served an exempt function.143 
 
with regard to voter education materials, which are obviously only of use to the 
public when made available during an election campaign. 
 138. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154, at Situation 2; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 
1980-2 C.B. 178. 
 139. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2). 
 140. Priv. Ltr. Rul.  96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996). 
 141. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1985). 
 142. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 
21, 1997). 
 143. See id.  It is uncertain how this analysis would apply to a 501(c)(4) 
conducting such activity.  It might be considered exempt function activity and 
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Finally, in 1999, another letter ruling pushed the 527 envelope 
even further.144  The ruling concluded that a whole host of activities 
that, at least generically, could be legally conducted by a 501(c)(3), 
would be treated as 527 exempt functions based largely on the 
intent of the organization, as evidenced by factors such as 
targeting, polling, and expert advice about the likely electoral 
effect of various messages and activities.145  The covered activities 
included ballot measure advocacy and other lobbying activity, 
which had traditionally been presumed permissible for a 501(c)(3) 
(and which, therefore, would constitute the promotion of social 
welfare for a 501(c)(4)).146  This ruling opened up the possibility 
that this advocacy would be considered campaign intervention if 
the organization’s primary purpose in engaging in the ballot 
measure work was to increase turnout of voters likely to vote for 
identified candidates.  Viewed externally, this activity would seem 
wholly appropriate for a 501(c)(3), but it could be treated as an 
exempt function, apparently, solely because of the taxpayer’s 
intent.  Because the ruling was issued to a taxpayer seeking to 
establish its political motivation, the ruling gives little insight into 
how this test might be applied to advocacy by a 501(c)(4) (or 
501(c)(3)) that would prefer not to have its ballot measure 
activities characterized as political. 
In 2000, an IRS ruling determined that an organization 
applying for 501(c)(4) status did not qualify because its primary 
activities were campaign intervention.147  Factors supporting that 
conclusion also led to a finding that the organization was primarily 
operated to conduct 527 exempt functions.  There are not enough 
facts in the ruling to let us know whether this is based on a belief 
that 501(c)(4) political activity and 527 exempt function describe 
 
therefore not part of the 501(c)(4)’s social welfare function.  Alternatively, a 
501(c)(4) could argue that its activity is primarily directed towards lobbying and 
therefore should not be treated as a 527 expenditure. 
 144. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999). 
 145. Id. 
 146. In fact, earlier rulings had also concluded that under certain 
circumstances ballot measure activity would be an exempt function.  
Communications regarding a ballot measure that prominently featured an 
individual’s name and picture were found to be for an exempt purpose although 
they did not mention the person’s candidacy.  Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-30-008 (Apr. 
16, 1991).  Even if the message did not identify a candidate it could be an exempt 
function if the advocacy was carried to encourage turnout of voters favorable to 
candidates supporting the issue.  Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-49-002 (June 30, 1992). 
 147. Field Serv. Adv. 2000-37-040 (June 19, 2000). 
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the same activities, so that 501(c)(4) and 527 are indeed mirror 
images of each other, or whether the activities were so clearly 
“political” under either section that the distinction did not matter 
to the conclusion reached.148 
The problem with using these rulings to understand the 
parameters defining 501(c)(4) political activity is that they 
responded to requests from taxpayers affirmatively seeking to 
characterize their activities as 527 exempt functions.  Thus, they 
presented their activities as avowedly intended and designed to 
influence elections.  In light of that approach, it would have been 
difficult to conclude that the activities were anything other than 
appropriate exempt function activities for a 527 political 
organization.  However, for 501(c)(4) taxpayers who have not so 
carefully mustered evidence of the intent and expected effects of 
their actions, the rulings shed little light on the question of how 
activities will be judged. 
There is also a significant degree of uncertainty about the 
treatment of “dual purpose” activities conducted by a 501(c)(4).  
For instance, suppose an organization engages in lobbying activities 
for the primary purpose of influencing legislation, but talks about a 
legislator’s position on the issue using rhetoric that it knows is 
likely to influence some voters in an upcoming election.  Will this 
electoral element cause the activity to be considered political?  Or 
is the entire activity classified based on the organization’s primary 
motivation for conducting it? 
Before publication of these rulings, many advisors to 
nonprofits had believed that there was a “gray area” open to 
501(c)(4)s between the line of 501(c)(3) campaign intervention 
and 527 exempt function.  Advocacy outside of the 501(c)(3) safe 
harbors could be conducted by a 501(c)(4) without risk.  By 
pushing the lines delimiting 527 and 501(c)(3) activities together 
in the sphere of candidate elections, those rulings seem to have 
eliminated any margin of safety available to 501(c)(4)s.  Given the 
indefinite “facts and circumstances” test that is used to determine 
prohibited campaign intervention, exempt organizations previously 
thought they could safely protect the exempt status of a 501(c)(3) 
organization by conducting any questionable activities with a 
501(c)(4).  Now they must be concerned about whether this would 
cause the 501(c)(4) to be primarily engaged in political activities 
 
 148. Id. 
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which, because of its close relationship to the 501(c)(3), could also 
jeopardize the 501(c)(3)’s status.  Under the reasoning of these 
rulings, it is necessary to know the characterization of every activity 
carried out so there can be less tolerance for uncertainty.  Yet the 
rulings use the same nebulous “facts and circumstances” analysis 
used in the 501(c)(3) context to identify 527 exempt function 
activity, a situation that provides no clear guidance to 501(c)(4)s 
seeking to preserve their status. 
2. Distinctions Among the Tests 
Section 527 organizations’ exempt functions include activities 
not covered by the 501(c)(3) prohibition and presumably also not 
political activity for a 501(c)(4).  The definition of 527 “exempt 
function” in the statute explicitly extends to areas that are not 
within the 501(c)(3) campaign intervention prohibition.149  As 
discussed above, 501(c)(3) campaign intervention is explicitly 
limited by regulation to “elective public office,” and 501(c)(4) 
political activity is implicitly so limited as well.  In contrast, the 
exempt function of a 527 political organization includes 
influencing the “selection, nomination, election, or appointment 
of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or 
office in a political organization. . . .”150  Thus, unlike the 501(c)(3) 
prohibition, the statutory definition of exempt function applies to 
non-elected public offices, and to office in a political 
organization.151 
The regulations do not further delineate the scope of offices 
with which the 527 exempt function is concerned.  Most of the 
examples provided assume an elected office, or do not state 
whether the office is elected or appointed.152  However, one 
provision states that expenditures are not for an exempt function 
when incurred by a 501(c) organization associated with providing 
testimony in support of the confirmation of an individual to a 
 
 149. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2). 
 150. Id. 
 151. The statute also includes special treatment for newsletter funds 
maintained by a candidate or officeholder as a 527 political organization.  I.R.C. § 
527(g).  Newsletter funds, however, may not be used for campaign expenses.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.527-7(d) (1980).  In addition, paying for expenses associated with a 
political office that would be deductible as business expenses if paid by an 
individual office holder are treated as an exempt function under the statute.  
I.R.C. § 527(e)(2). 
 152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(c)(5) (1980). 
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cabinet position in response to a written request from a 
Congressional committee.153  From the context, it is not completely 
clear whether this is intended to set out a narrow exception for a 
501(c) organization, or to state more broadly that these 
expenditures would not be for an exempt function if conducted by 
a 527 organization.  It is certainly possible to read this example as 
defining a narrow region (invited Congressional testimony on 
cabinet appointments, and possibly other positions subject to 
Senate confirmation) where activity by a 527 will be treated as 
exempt function but the same activity by a 501(c)(4) is not 
considered an exempt function.154 
Beyond the language of the statute and regulations there is no 
precedential authority to illuminate the extent to which 527 
exempt function covers activity outside the area defined as 
501(c)(3) campaign intervention, but some non-precedential 
guidance supports distinctions between the tests.  A 1988 General 
Counsel Memorandum (GCM) confirmed that 527 exempt 
function and 501(c)(3) campaign intervention are not 
coterminous. 155  It concluded that 501(c)(3)s may seek to influence 
appointment of federal judges because judges do not hold elective 
public offices.156  The ruling further concludes that influencing 
judicial appointments is a 527 exempt function activity that triggers 
the 527(f) tax (discussed in Part II above) if conducted by a 501(c) 
organization.157  Announcement 88-114 publicized the IRS’s belief 
that this is the correct conclusion and solicited public comment.158  
Comment was also sought on whether the proposed application of 
the 527(f) tax to 501(c) organizations that seek to influence 
judicial appointments should be only prospective, as many such 
organizations, particularly 501(c)(3)s, had not been aware that this 
activity might be considered an exempt function.159  No further 
guidance has been forthcoming and the most recent IRS 
Continuing Professional Education text on Election-Year Activities 
 
 153. Id. § 1.527-6(b)(4). 
 154. Similarly, illegal expenditures are not for an exempt function, Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.527-2(c)(4) (1980), but presumably would be treated as campaign intervention 
for a 501(c)(3) if made to influence an election.  
 155. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Jan. 21, 1988). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Announcement 88-114, 1988-37, I.R.B. 26 (Aug. 30, 1988). 
 159. Id. 
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states that no final determination of the issue has been made.160  
Nonetheless, the GCM remains as a non-precedential indication 
that 501(c)(3)s may legally engage in some activities that constitute 
a 527 exempt function. 
As discussed above, an activity or purpose that comes within 
the ambit of “charitable” and is therefore permissible for a 
501(c)(3) should per se qualify as the promotion of social welfare 
for a 501(c)(4).161  Thus, the logic of this GCM indicates that a 
501(c)(4) could be organized to primarily attempt to influence 
federal judicial or executive branch appointments and qualify 
under 501(c)(4).162  On the other hand, if this is exempt function 
activity for a 527, this same organization could equally well qualify 
as a 527 political organization. 
Of course, the conclusions of GCM 39,694 and Announcement 
88-114 caused substantial controversy and have never been adopted 
in precedential guidance.  But based on the statutory language 
there are less controversial examples of activity that could be 
primary for either a 501(c)(4) or a 527 organization, such as 
attempting to influence elections or appointments of individuals to 
office in political parties.  For instance, if an organization’s purpose 
is to promote social welfare by increasing the number of African-
Americans in important leadership positions, it might choose to 
further this purpose by advocating for the selection of a specific 
African-American as chair of a national party committee.  Were the 
organization to engage in this activity exclusively (or primarily), it 
would appear to be equally able to qualify as exempt under either § 
501(c)(4) or § 527. 
There may be a fairly narrow set of activities that constitute a 
527 exempt function but not campaign intervention for a 501(c) 
organization, and few organizations are engaged primarily in 
carrying out these activities.  Nonetheless, it is possible under 
(relatively) undisputed provisions of current law that an 
organization’s primary activities could simultaneously be the 
promotion of social welfare and 527 exempt function.  At least to 
this extent, the exempt function of a 527 organization does not 
define 501(c)(4) political activity.  If it is correct, as stated in the 
PLRs discussed above, that “any activities constituting prohibited 
political intervention by a 501(c)(3) organization are activities that 
 
 160. 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra note 37, at 397 n. 27. 
 161. See discussion, supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 162. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Jan. 21, 1988). 
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must be less than the primary activities of a 501(c)(4) organization, 
which are, in turn, activities that are exempt functions for a 527 
organization,”163 then this can be true only with regard to 
campaigns for elected office.  In other words, despite the broad 
wording adopted, the rulings at most indicate that seeking to 
influence an election and intervening in a campaign represent the 
same thing.  Because the taxpayers seeking those PLRs were not 
seeking to influence the selection of individuals for other office, 
their reasoning did not address the overlap between exempt 
functions and 501(c) activity in those cases. 
VI. STRATEGIC ISSUES DRIVING CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 
Having defined (insofar as possible) the law governing 
election-related activities by 501(c)(3)s, 501(c)(4)s, and 527s, we 
turn now to the strategic issues driving political operatives to 
choose one form over another.  As discussed below, choices are 
often not made to thwart the policy goals of campaign finance 
regulation, but are rather made as rational efforts to preserve 
resources and reduce administrative burdens. 
A. Tax on 501(c) Political Activities Under § 527(f) 
The most commonly discussed factor pushing political 
activities into 527 organizations is the potential tax imposed under 
§ 527(f) on 501(c) organizations engaged in political activity. 
Section 527(f) subjects 501(c) organizations to tax on the 
lesser of their investment income or their exempt function 
expenditures.164  Regulations set out the application of this tax, and 
in doing so create some exceptions that presumably would be 
exempt function activities otherwise, but will not trigger the 527(f) 
tax, despite statutory language stating that all expenditures by a 
501(c) organization for an exempt function trigger the 527(f) 
tax.165  In addition, a recent Revenue Ruling discussed the factors to 
be considered in determining whether a 501(c)’s activity is a 527 
 
 163. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24, 
1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 21, 1997). 
 164. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1). The policy rationale frequently put forward to explain 
this tax is that it levels the playing field between 527 organizations, which must 
always pay this investment income tax, and 501(c)s, which are subjected to it only 
if they venture into the area of activity occupied by the 527s. 
 165. Id. 
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exempt function, and set out a number of very useful examples.166 
1. Explicit Exceptions from Definition of “Exempt Function” 
Regulations provide two explicit areas where activity by a 
501(c) organization will not trigger application of tax under § 
527(f)—that is, activities that are excluded from the definition of 
exempt function when conducted by a 501(c) organization.167  
These exceptions apply specifically to the imposition of 527(f) tax 
on 501(c)s, rather than as part of the general definition of exempt 
functions, and thus presumably describe things that would 
otherwise be 527 exempt function activities. 
The first of these explicit exceptions applies to organizations 
that appear “before any legislative body in response to a written 
request by such body for the purpose of influencing the 
appointment or confirmation of an individual to a public office, 
any expenditure directly related to such appearance is not treated 
as an expenditure for an exempt function.”168  Because of the 
narrow wording of this provision, it sounds particularly like an 
exception, implying that other advocacy on appointments or 
confirmations to a covered office would be taxable activity.  If that 
is correct, it is probable that invited testimony on a legislative 
confirmation by a 527 organization would count as an exempt 
function, but not be considered an exempt function for purposes 
of the 527(f) tax when conducted by a 501(c)(4).169  Of course, this 
conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the clear statutory language 
 
 166. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. 328.  It may be worth noting that Rev. Rul. 
81-95 mentioned the 527(f) tax as potentially applying to a 501(c)(4)'s political 
activities, but did not assume that all activities that constitute campaign 
intervention are 527 exempt function activities that trigger the tax.  It was carefully 
worded only to say that those expenditures that are for a 527 exempt function 
would subject the 501(c)(4) to tax under 527(f).  It is unclear whether this 
implicitly suggests that 501(c)(4) political activity was not considered to be 
identical to 527 exempt function, or if the question was simply not addressed.  
Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. 
 167. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.527-6(b)(4), (5) (1980).  See also supra notes 154–55. 
 168. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(4) (1980). 
 169. Id.  This exception is also set out in an example which is part of the 
regulations defining a 527 exempt function.  Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(c)(5)(vi) (as 
amended in 1985).  However, the example is limited to the activities of a 501(c) 
organization.  It is unclear whether its inclusion in that section indicates that 
invited testimony is universally excluded from the definition of exempt function 
or, as appears more likely, it is simply included there along with other examples.  
Id. 
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about application of the tax.170 
The second explicit exception provides that “nonpartisan” 
voter registration and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns are also 
not treated as exempt function activity when conducted by a 501(c) 
organization.171   To qualify as “nonpartisan,” the campaign may not 
be explicitly identified with a party or candidate.172  The regulations 
do not impose any additional limitation on these voter involvement 
activities.  It is likely that the intent in drafting this provision was to 
limit the exception to 501(c)(3)-permissible activity, but the 
regulations explicitly state only the one requirement.  Narrowly 
focused, issue-based voter involvement messages might be 
considered prohibited for a 501(c)(3), and indeed may be 
intended to influence an election.  Nonetheless, there is a viable 
reading of this exception that would exclude such communications 
from the definition of exempt function for 527(f) purposes.  By 
expressly stating this as an exception, the regulations certainly 
suggest that voter involvement campaigns not identified with a 
candidate or party could also potentially be carried out by a 527 
organization and be considered an exempt function.  Statements 
made at the time of publication of the final regulations173 suggest 
that this provision was intended to cover GOTV and voter 
registration activities permitted by federal and state election laws.  
Because those laws allow 501(c)(4)s to engage in voter motivation 
campaigns that focus more narrowly on divisive issues than would 
be permitted to a 501(c)(3), it is at least arguable that this 
exception exempts from 527(f) tax some activities that would 
constitute 501(c)(3) campaign intervention. 
The 1999 PLR also concluded that voter registration, voter 
motivation, and GOTV communications would be treated as 
exempt functions when conducted by the 527 organization, even if 
they were not always identified with a specific party or candidate.174  
It is not clear whether this was intended as a narrowing reading of § 
1.527-6(b)(5), interpreting it to apply only to 501(c)(3)-permissible 
activities.  It could also be confirmation that there is a set of voter-
activation messages that will be treated as exempt function when 
 
 170. The statutory language states that all expenditures by a 501(c) 
organization for an exempt function trigger the 527(f) tax.  I.R.C. § 527. 
 171. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(5) (1980). 
 172. Id. 
 173. T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360. 
 174. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999). 
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conducted by a 527, yet not trigger the tax when conducted by a 
501(c)(4) due to the exception. 
The explicit exceptions from 527(f) tax set out in the 
regulations for confirmation hearings, invited testimony, and voter 
activation work set out activities that are not taxable when engaged 
in by a 501(c)(4), but that apparently (and logically) could also be 
conducted by a 527 and treated as exempt function. 
2. Reserved Regulations 
When regulations under § 527 were first proposed, a number 
of comments pointed out that there are sound reasons that a 527 
tax on 501(c) organizations should be applied consistent with 
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) that 
permit 501(c) organizations to engage in certain activities without 
establishing a separate segregated fund.175  Lack of consistency 
between FECA and tax law would create a significant burden on 
these organizations.  In order to maximize their use of non-PAC176 
money as permitted by campaign finance laws, and yet avoid paying 
the 527(f) tax, they would be required to create two SSFs (a 
traditional PAC and an SSF for 527 exempt function expenditures 
that fall outside the regulatory scope of FECA).  This would double 
the organization’s bookkeeping and administrative burden, 
contrary to at least one expression of Congressional intent.177 
A Congressional desire to maintain consistency between the 
two sets of laws was also expressed: 
 
In prescribing such rules, regulations, and forms under 
this section, the [Federal Election] Commission and the 
Internal Revenue Service shall consult and work together 
to promulgate rules, regulations, and forms which are 
mutually consistent. The Commission shall report to the 
 
    175.    Those comments are discussed in 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, 
supra note 37, at 437. 
 176. As noted earlier in this article, we use “PAC” as a simpler and more easily 
understood term than the more technically accurate language describing a 
political committee subject to the state or federal legal restrictions, such as FECA’s 
restrictions on the size and source of contributions. In the context of this 
discussion, such a “PAC” refers to a separate segregated fund maintained in 
compliance with the restrictions of applicable campaign finance laws. 
 177. “It was our intention, in order to promote uniformity and simplicity of 
regulation, that the tax law match the then existing [Federal Election] Campaign 
Act restrictions.”  122 CONG. REC. 12,200 (1976) (statement of Rep. Ullman). 
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Congress annually on the steps it has taken to comply with 
this subsection.178 
 
On the other hand, Congress had clearly spoken elsewhere to 
say that a 501(c)(4) organization would be subject to tax under 
527(f) if it “expends any amount during the taxable year directly 
(or through another organization) for an exempt function (within 
the meaning of subsection 527(e)). . . .”179 The statute includes no 
exceptions.  The legislative history indicates an intent that 501(c) 
organizations and 527s should be treated on an equal basis for tax 
purposes to the extent they engage in the same activities.180 
Unable to satisfactorily resolve this tension, the IRS adopted 
final regulations that put off making a final decision on the tax 
treatment of electoral activity permitted by campaign finance law.181  
Two types of expenditures by 501(c) organizations will be taxable 
exempt function expenditures only to the extent provided in 
sections of regulations which both state only, “Reserved.”182  Upon 
publication of the final § 527 regulations, the IRS indicated that 
any tax imposed on a 501(c) based on activities falling within the 
ambit of the reserved regulations would be applied only 
prospectively.183 
One class of expenditures clearly covered by the reserved 
regulations is indirect costs—expenditures for establishing, 
maintaining, and fundraising for an SSF.184  The other category is 
expenditures “which are otherwise allowable under the Federal 
Election Campaign Act or similar State statute.”185  There is no 
precedential authority further explaining the scope of this 
provision.  Based solely on the published regulations, one could 
read them to exempt from taxation all those expenditures legal 
under federal campaign finance law, that is, those short of express 
advocacy, coordination with a candidate, or electioneering 
communications.186  This approach would be consistent with the 
 
 178. 2 U.S.C. § 438(f) (2000). 
 179. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1).  The tax is imposed on the lesser of the organization’s 
exempt function expenditures or its net investment income.  Id. 
 180. S. REP. NO. 93-1357 at 7505 (1974). 
 181. T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(2) (1980). 
 185. Id. § 1.527-6(b)(3). 
 186. Recent amendments to FECA added restrictions on “electioneering 
communications” and further modified the law.  See 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (West 
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reasoning behind the decision to reserve the regulations, which was 
to maintain consistency between tax and election law. 
Some IRS texts suggest a more limited reading.  The IRS 
discussion of the final 527 regulations cites some specific activities 
expressly permitted by the statutory language of FECA.187  
Subsequent CPE texts have reiterated that member 
communications and SSF administrative and fundraising costs 
determine the coverage of this reserved section.188  The drafters of 
the regulations clearly had these categories in mind, but they may 
not have focused more specifically on the entire range of activities 
legally permitted under FECA.  It is uncertain how to apply the 
reserved regulations to other activities that are clearly permissible 
under FECA, at least as constitutional limits on FECA’s scope have 
been developed in the case law.  In other words, it is uncertain 
whether the exception applies to activities expressly permitted by 
the statutory language of FECA, or more broadly, to those activities 
legal for a 501(c)(4) under the campaign finance law as 
interpreted by regulatory and judicial decisions.189 
In addition, there is no further authority as to what a “similar 
state statute” is.  Is it one that regulates campaign finance, or one 
that allows a corporation to create an SSF?  Particularly in light of 
the extraordinarily broad scope of different state campaign finance 
laws, this creates further uncertainty for 501(c)(4)s engaged in 
advocacy related to state office, officeholders, and policies.  A 
logically consistent resolution is that the reserved sections would 
not protect legal state activities that would not be legal for the 
organization under FECA.  But the devil is in the details.  If a state 
law differs only slightly from FECA in what it permits, will activities 
falling into that small area of discrepancy trigger the 527(f) tax?190 
 
2004). 
 187. T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360. 
 188. See, e.g., 2003 POLITICAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES CPE, supra note 99, at L-10. 
 189. Further complexity is added by the fact that unlike most corporations 
certain 501(c)(4) organizations, termed Qualified Nonprofit Corporations, are 
permitted by FEC regulations (implementing the holding in Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986)) to engage in express 
advocacy for or against federal candidates.  Presumably this expressly political 
advocacy would be treated as a 527 exempt function regardless of the correct 
interpretation of the reserved regulations. 
 190. For instance, FEC regulations permit “occasional, isolated or incidental” 
use of corporate resources by employees who are volunteering for political 
campaigns.  Occasional use is defined to be no more than four hours per month. 
11 C.F.R. § 114.9 (1980).  If a state law allows a corporation to permit volunteers to 
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A 1984 Technical Advice Memorandum concluded that a 
union’s contributions to state candidates, permitted by applicable 
campaign finance law, would trigger the 527 tax.191  It did not 
clarify the underlying reasoning by deciding, for instance, that the 
state law was not “similar.”  Rather, the ruling cited what its 
author(s) perceived as clear congressional intent to impose the 527 
tax on all direct political expenditures by a 501(c) organization.  It 
states that “we can see no reason to conclude that anything other 
than indirect political expenditures would be covered” by the 
reserved sections of the regulations.192  This is obviously too broadly 
stated.  Even the IRS texts that read the scope of “permitted by 
FECA” narrowly would permit some activities beyond indirect 
expenditures, for example, express advocacy communications to 
members. 
When the 527 regulations were promulgated, the IRS 
indicated that these sections were reserved pending resolution of 
the relationship between tax law and FECA.193  This resolution may 
prove difficult to achieve administratively.  Certainly it would be 
difficult to craft a regulation explicitly defining an activity 
simultaneously as an exempt function for a 527 and not an exempt 
function (that is, not taxable) for a 501(c), yet avoid a conflict with 
the plain language of I.R.C. § 527(f).  The desire for consistency 
between FEC and IRS regulation may be irreconcilable with the 
statutory language of 527 imposing a tax on any exempt function 
expenditure by a 501(c)(4).  Hence, “resolution” of the 
relationship between campaign finance and tax laws may require 
legislative action.  There is a persistent tension between the two 
goals of leveling the playing field (by imposing 527(f) tax on 
501(c)(4) exempt function activities) and consistent administration 
of tax and campaign finance laws (so organizations have only one 
set of administrative rules to apply). 
 
use its offices up to eight hours per month, would the value of the additional four 
hours’ use constitute a taxable exempt function expenditure? 
 191. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-02-003 (Sept. 27, 1984). 
 192. Id. 
 193. 181 T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360. 
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3.  Revenue Ruling 2004-6194 
In December 2003, the IRS did something both rare and 
surprising: it released a precedential ruling in the exempt 
organization area.195  The ruling expressly addresses only the 
application of § 527(f) investment income tax to 501(c)(4), 
501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations.196  Specifically, it discusses 
whether expenditures for certain public communications should be 
characterized as 527 exempt functions and thus trigger the tax.  
Despite the fact that the discussion and examples are limited to the 
context of campaigns for elected public office, exempt 
organizations of all stripes are looking to this new ruling with great 
interest. 
After restating the familiar refrain that “all the facts and 
circumstances must be considered,” the ruling goes on to provide 
representative lists of factors that will be taken into account.197  
Summarizing the relevant factors illustrated in the ruling, a public 
communication is more likely to be deemed a 527 exempt function 
if it: identifies a candidate for office; is timed to coincide with an 
electoral campaign; targets voters in a particular election;198 
 
 194. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. 328.  The authors are not generally 
inclined to believe in either conspiracy theories or numerology, and hence ascribe 
no significance whatsoever to the fact that this major new IRS ruling on political 
campaign activities by nonprofits bears the same number, 2004-6, as the FEC’s 
notice of proposed rulemaking on political campaign activities by nonprofits. 
 195. Id.  This ruling is discussed in this section because on its terms it directly 
addresses only the application of the § 527(f) investment income tax to 501(c) 
organizations.  Nevertheless, it certainly would provide valuable guidance to § 527 
organizations interested in determining whether their activities constitute exempt 
functions.  In light of the substantial overlap between the 527 exempt function 
and 501(c)(3) campaign intervention, the ruling is also of great interest in 
determining whether election-year advocacy activities would jeopardize a 
501(c)(3)’s exempt status.  IRS officials have acknowledged this relevance in 
public remarks.  See Judith Kindell, Remarks, in 43 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 244, 245 
(2004) (statements of Judith Kindell of the IRS regarding Rev. Rul. 2004-6).     
 196. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. 328. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.  The meaning of “targets” as used here is not further elaborated.  Id.  
In all the examples, communications are directed at an elected official’s 
constituents, who are naturally the logical audience for both electoral and bona 
fide lobbying communications.  Id.  In the opinion of the authors, this factor 
alone, without further elaboration, is not particularly helpful in distinguishing 527 
exempt function communications from other advocacy messages.  See Judith 
Kindell, Remarks, in 43 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 244, 245 (2004) (“[a]ll we intended 
when we said the communication targets the voters is that it was directed at the 
same voters.”). 
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identifies the candidate’s position on a public policy issue; focuses 
on an issue that has been raised as distinguishing candidates in the 
campaign; and is not part of an ongoing series of substantially 
similar advocacy communications by the organization on the same 
issue.199  A public communication is less likely to be considered an 
exempt function if it: identifies legislation or another specific event 
outside the organization’s control that the organization hopes to 
influence; is timed to coincide with an event outside the 
organization’s control that the organization hopes to influence; 
identifies the candidate solely as an official in a position to act on 
the issue; or identifies the candidate solely as a key sponsor of 
legislation.200 
These factors are then applied in a series of specific 
examples.201  Some are unsurprising in their conclusions, but a few 
take on more challenging situations.  For instance, an 
advertisement that encourages citizens to “Tell Governor E what 
you think about our under-funded schools” constitutes a 527-
exempt function, even though the text contains no references to 
the Governor as a candidate or the pending election.202  Key to this 
outcome seem to be the facts that the opposing candidate has 
raised funding for public education as a campaign issue, the 
advertisement is not part of a series of substantially similar advocacy 
communications by the organization on the same issue, it is aired 
on radio shortly before the election, and there is no pending 
legislative vote or other activity the organization may be hoping to 
influence.203  Thus, while the message on its face appears to be 
solely about a public policy issue, an inquiry into external 
circumstances compels a conclusion that it will be treated as 
political campaign activity. 
The final example also concludes that a television 
advertisement with no reference to voting, elections, or candidacy 
nonetheless constitutes an exempt function.204  The critical factors 
here appear to be timing, identifying a public official’s position as 
opposed to that of the organizations, and probably most critically 
that the ad is not tied to an event outside the organization’s 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id., Situation 4. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id., Situation 6. 
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control, but rather calls for moratorium on imposition of the death 
penalty, a call that the IRS presumably believes could have been 
made at another time if the true intent was not to influence a 
pending election. 
This ruling is the first precedential guidance issued that helps 
clarify the ambiguity discussed above regarding the meaning of the 
reserved sections of the regulations under § 527.205  The 
communications described in the specific examples are carefully 
drafted to be clearly “allowable under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act.”206  That is, the examples that refer to federal 
candidates are crafted to describe communications that any 
corporation, including 501(c) nonprofit corporations, may legally 
pay for with general treasury funds consistent with federal 
campaign finance laws.  The ruling unambiguously holds that 
expenditures for these communications trigger application of the 
527(f) tax.207  Questions still remain about “similar state statutes,” 
but there is now precedential authority to indicate that “allowable 
under FECA” cannot be read to include any expenditure 
permissible under federal election law. 
Revenue Ruling 2004-6 is a laudable attempt to provide 
meaningful guidance to politically active exempt organizations and 
their advisors.  By taking on examples that mix “good” and “bad” 
facts, it demonstrates how real-world situations might be resolved.  
However, it also demonstrates the breadth of the IRS’s 
interpretation of the 527 exempt function.  Together with the 
remaining uncertainties of the “facts and circumstances” approach, 
this broad sweep makes this standard ill-suited for importation into 
the campaign finance world, an area of law that is designed to 
address different governmental interests.208 
B. Gift Tax 
Recent popularity in the use of 527 organizations has also been 
driven by the fact that contributions to most 501(c) organizations 
(other than 501(c)(3)s) are subject to the gift tax209 but 
 
 205. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 206. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(3) (1980). 
 207. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. 328. 
 208. See infra Part VII (discussing different constitutional analyses of speech 
regulation under tax and election law). 
 209. I.R.C. § 2522. 
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contributions to 527s are not.210  Individual donors are generally 
subject to a tax on gratuitous transfers of funds in excess of an 
annual exclusion.211  (This annual exclusion is indexed and was 
recently raised from $10,000 per year to $11,000.)212  Gifts in excess 
of that amount will either be taxed or consume a portion of the 
individual’s lifetime exclusion from gift and estate tax.213 
Gifts to certain organizations are exempt from the gift tax.  
Gifts to 527 organizations are exempt from the tax, as are gifts to 
501(c)(3)s.214  Revenue Ruling 82-216 states that “gratuitous 
transfers to persons other than organizations described in § 527(e) 
of the Code are subject to the gift tax absent any specific statute to 
the contrary, even though the transfers may be motivated by a 
desire to advance the donor’s own social, political, or charitable 
goals.”215  There is no such exemption for 501(c)s other than 
501(c)(3)s. 
The incentive created seems to have been inadvertent.  It is 
not at all clear why Congress chose to exempt 527s and 501(c)(3)s 
but not other 501(c) organizations.  Indeed, such an outcome is 
particularly absurd when applied to 501(c)(4) organizations, many 
of which engage solely in activities that, if separated out, could be 
conducted independently by 501(c)(3)s and 527s.  There is no 
apparent rationale for taxing gifts to the 501(c)(4) but exempting 
from tax contributions to other organizations carrying out the same 
functions.  Nonetheless, large donors are understandably reluctant 
to subject themselves to possible tax liability by making a 
contribution to a 501(c) when an alternative exists in the form of a 
contribution to a 527 (for political activities) or a 501(c)(3) (for 
non-political activities—with the added bonus, in the case of a 
501(c)(3) contribution, of a charitable tax deduction).216 
 
 210. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) (noting exemption from gift tax for § 527 
organizations). 
 211. I.R.C. §§ 2501–05. 
 212. Id. § 2503(b)(2). 
 213. This lifetime exclusion is currently $1,500,000.  I.R.C. § 2010(c).  Absent 
any additional action from Congress, the repeal of the estate tax (to which the gift 
tax is linked) in 2010 will briefly change this exclusion, but the $1,000,000 gift and 
estate tax exclusion will return in 2011 when the estate tax repeal expires.  I.R.C. § 
2210.  (A full discussion of the ups and downs of the estate tax and the political 
wrangling it has engendered is, mercifully, beyond the scope of this article.) 
 214. I.R.C. §§ 2501(a)(5), 2522. 
 215. Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220. 
 216. For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of the applicability of the 
gift tax to 501(c) organizations, including an ingenious argument against 
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C. Primary Purpose Test 
The discussion above makes it unnecessary to belabor the 
point here, but it is also important to remember that the primary 
purpose tests discussed above in the context of 501(c)(4) and 527 
organizations also drive the choice of organization used for 
political advocacy. 
As noted above, 501(c)(4)s and other organizations exempt 
from federal tax under § 501(c) of the I.R.C. (except for 
501(c)(3)s) may engage in efforts to influence elections as long as 
such activities do not become the “primary purpose” of the 
organization.217  501(c) organizations (or their donors) that wish to 
engage in additional partisan election-related activity without a 
concomitant expansion of the non-partisan aspects of the 
organization’s program often look to create 527 organizations, 
typically separate segregated funds of the parent organization. 
D. Legitimacy of These Strategic Choices 
It is worth noting in discussing the strategic reasons pushing 
political activities into the much-maligned 527 organizations that 
none of the three key reasons discussed above for the growth of 
527s as a political tool are anything other than a rational choice to 
achieve legitimate goals without wasted resources.  Donors wishing 
to engage in political activity need not fritter away their funds on 
527(f) tax, gift tax, or funds spent inflating the non-political work 
of 501(c) organizations.  Indeed, since the year 2000, they have 
been willing to subject themselves to increased disclosure 
requirements to make those contributions.218 
Furthermore, the use of 527s for political activities was 
foreseen and acceded to by Congress.  Congress passed the 
disclosure law just cited in the wake of the presidential primaries of 
2000 and several highly publicized cases of 527 intervention in 
campaigns.219 Yet Congress chose to require disclosure rather than 
 
application of the gift tax to 501(c)s, see Barbara K. Rhomberg, The Law Remains 
Unsettled on Gift Taxation of Section 501(c)(4) Contributions, 15 TAXATION OF EXEMPTS 
62 (2003). 
 217. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 218. See I.R.C. § 527(j) (requiring disclosure of all donors to 527 organizations 
not already required to report donors to federal or state election authorities).  No 
equivalent disclosure requirements exist for donors to 501(c) organizations 
engaged in political activities. 
 219. See e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, The 2000 Campaign: The Tactics; Wealthy 
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attempt to rein in 527s.220 
In short, despite much of the recent discourse portraying the 
use of 527 organizations as an attempt to circumvent legal 
restrictions, these organizations are anticipated and even 
encouraged by provisions of the tax code; they are not “loopholes” 
or abuses of the system. 
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In light of the foregoing, can the standards of federal tax law 
constitutionally be applied in attempting to restrict or regulate the 
political activities of tax-exempt organizations?  We suggest that the 
answer is no.  The vague definitions and tests that restrict the 
political activities of tax-exempt organizations are problematic even 
in the context of the government recognition of tax-exempt status.  
They are fatally flawed when viewed under the strict constitutional 
scrutiny that applies to federal election law. 
A. Standards of Review 
Government restrictions on speech, particularly core political 
speech, face a far more stringent constitutional standard than the 
standard that applies to restrictions on political activities of tax-
exempt organizations. 
The courts often have been reluctant to approve restrictions 
on core political speech under federal election law.  In general, any 
such government restrictions must survive strict scrutiny by the 
courts, i.e. they must be necessary to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.  In Federal Election Commission v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. the Supreme Court held that a 
tax-exempt organization was exempt from the FECA restrictions on 
express advocacy communications because “government must 
curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular 
problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does 
not pose the danger that has prompted regulation.”221  The Court 
 
Texan Says He Bought Anti-McCain Ads, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2000, at A1 (describing 
the funding provided by Texas businessman Sam Wyly to the 527 organization 
Republicans for Clean Air that was used to fund independent ads bought to 
support the presidential campaign of George W. Bush). 
 220. Indeed, Congress had another opportunity when it amended the 
disclosure law in 2002 following the passage of BCRA.  See supra note 1.  Again 
Congress chose the route of disclosure, not regulation. 
 221. 479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986). 
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has been similarly protective of political speech on numerous 
occasions.  In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court reminded us that 
“[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of 
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of 
government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment 
affords the broadest protection to such political expression in 
order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.’” 222  The Buckley Court went on to cite other cases in which 
the Supreme Court viewed restrictions on political speech with a 
skeptical eye.223 
Buckley was the Supreme Court case from 1976 that struck 
down much of the original FECA as an unconstitutional regulation 
of protected political speech.  The Buckley Court upheld the 
portion of the law restricting the use of corporate or union funds 
for certain activities only by narrowly interpreting the law to restrict 
what became known as “express advocacy” communications—
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified federal candidate.224 Over the years of post-Buckley 
litigation, many courts have limited the scope of “express advocacy” 
to communications that clearly identify a federal candidate and use 
the so-called “magic words” in reference to that candidate—“vote 
for,” “vote against,” “support,” “oppose,” “elect,” “defeat,” “re-elect,” 
etc.225  Because Congress failed to set any other standard that the 
Court might have approved, the express advocacy “magic words” 
 
 222. 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957)). 
 223. Id. at 14–15.  “[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major 
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates . . . .”  Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).  “[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
“[I]t can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and 
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”  
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
 224. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. 
 225. Id.  See also, e.g., Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 810 (1997); Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1055 (4th Cir. 1997); 
Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 1999); 
Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 
1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding for narrow definition of ‘express advocacy’); 
but see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 850 (1987) (upholding broader interpretation of “express advocacy”). 
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test became the gauge against which all corporate or union 
political communications were measured. 
In contrast, tax-exempt organizations voluntarily assume 
restrictions far more onerous than those that the government may 
generally impose because the organizations accept these 
restrictions in exchange for the grant of certain tax benefits.  As a 
key case upholding the restriction on political activities by 
501(c)(3)s explains: 
 
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a 
matter of grace rather than right, we hold that the 
limitations contained in section 501(c)(3) withholding 
exemption from nonprofit corporations do not deprive 
[the organization] of its constitutionally guaranteed right 
of free speech. The taxpayer may engage in all such 
activities without restraint, subject, however, to 
withholding of the exemption or, in the alternative, the 
taxpayer may refrain from such activities and obtain the 
privilege of exemption.226 
 
Even in the context of tax exemption, there are limits on the 
ability of the government to impose restrictions on constitutionally 
protected activities as a condition of a grant of tax benefits.227  In 
particular, organizations that do not receive the much-favored 
501(c)(3) status, with the accompanying ability to accept tax-
deductible contributions, do not enjoy the same level of tax subsidy 
(if any).  It seems reasonable that courts would be willing to 
countenance fewer restrictions imposed in return for this less 
favorable treatment.  Nonetheless, the courts generally have been 
willing to allow at least some substantial limits on the otherwise 
protected activities of tax-exempt organizations.228 
B. Restrictions on Political Speech Under Tax Law 
As the discussion above makes clear, there is a great deal of 
uncertainty in existing law about definition of political activity for 
 
 226. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. U.S., 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 
1972). 
 227. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (overturning a law 
requiring anyone seeking a property tax exemption to declare that he or she did 
not advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government of the United States). 
 228. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 
540 (1983) (upholding restrictions on lobbying by 501(c)(3) organizations). 
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tax-exempt organizations.  Even if one theoretically determines 
that there is, in fact, a single line defining 501(c)(3) campaign 
intervention, 501(c)(4) political activity, and 527 exempt function, 
it must be acknowledged that this line has not been drawn with any 
precision.  The “facts and circumstances” approach may have the 
benefit of allowing a decision-maker to reach what he or she 
perceives as the “right” outcome in every case.  However, a test that 
puts this much discretion in the hands of the tax administrator 
could suffer from constitutional weaknesses.  It certainly provides 
no assurance to an organization that it will not be subject to tax, or 
even loss of its tax-exempt status, on the basis of activities that are 
plainly legal under applicable election law and in fact constitute 
protected political speech under the First Amendment. 
This vagueness is manifest in the definition of 527 exempt 
function as explored in the letter rulings in the late 1990s.229  How 
an activity will be treated for tax purposes depends on evidence of 
the organization’s subjective intent.  It appears possible that the 
exact same activity might be characterized as permissible 501(c)(3) 
activity or 527 exempt function based solely on evidence of the 
organization’s intent.230 
Congress need not subsidize protected political speech.231    
However, constitutional principles require that citizens be given 
reasonable notice of proscribed conduct.  A law will be struck if 
“men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning.”232  Laws are also invalidated if they are “wholly lacking in 
‘terms susceptible of objective measurement.’”233  The void-for-
vagueness doctrine further requires explicit standards for 
government officials, who might otherwise engage in arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.234 
 
 229. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 
21, 1997). 
 230. This is contrary to repeated IRS statements that subjective intent is 
irrelevant to identifying campaign intervention.  For a more nuanced discussion of 
the appropriate consideration of intent or state of mind in examining 501(c)(3) 
activities, see 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra note 37, at 350–52. 
 231. See Regan, 461 U.S. 540. 
 232. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (quoting Connally v. 
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).  See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
77 (1976). 
 233. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (quoting Cramp v. 
Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961)). 
 234. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 nn.3–4 (1972). This 
appears to be the position taken by the plaintiff in litigation currently pending in 
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The standard the IRS has set for 501(c)(4)s fails these tests.  
The regulations define social welfare activities as excluding “direct 
or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on 
behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.”235  On 
its face this standard appears to lack terminology that is susceptible 
of objective assessment.  Given the dearth of precedential guidance 
on the subject, it is arguably so vague as to what speech is 
encompassed within its ambit that ordinary people cannot know 
whether their organization is exempt under § 501(c)(4) and hence 
what requirements the tax law imposes on it.  Further, the 
imprecision of the “facts and circumstances” approach, together 
with the vagueness of the campaign intervention standard, enable 
arbitrary administration of these laws. 
This constitutional difficulty cannot be addressed by 
suggesting an organization could avoid legal difficulties by avoiding 
all political activity.  Even for tax-exempt organizations, this is core 
political speech protected under the First Amendment.  Adopting 
taxable status may also not be an option, because an organization 
whose primary activities are political may be forced into 527 status.  
Field Service Advice 2000-37-040 indicates that an organization that 
fails to be a 501(c)(4) because it primarily engages in political 
activity will be treated as a 527, and that 527 is not an elective 
provision.236  There is no safe area of operations for an organization 
uncertain how its activities will be classed by the IRS.  It must 
apparently be either a 501(c)(4) or a 527, but lacks sufficient 
guidance to determine in close cases which is the correct 
 
District Court.  See Complaint at ¶¶ 46–54, The Christian Coalition Int’l v. U.S., 
No. 2:01CV377 (E.D. Va.), available in 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 165-27.  The case 
appears to have stalled, but the authors have hopes that it will at some point 
proceed and shed further light on the questions discussed herein.  See also ABA 
Members Comment on Exempt Organizations and Politics, 45 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 136, 
161 n.73 (2004). 
 235. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990). 
 236. A recent circuit court decision appears to be to the contrary, upholding 
the registration and disclosure provisions of § 527 based in part on the idea that 
exemption under § 527 is optional.  Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. 
United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (S.D. Ala. 2002) vacated by Mobile Republican 
Assembly v. U.S., 353 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2003).   However IRS officials have 
stated that the Service reads this case to hold that registration is optional but 527 
status is not.  Edited Transcript of the January 30, 2004 ABA Tax Section EO Committee 
Meeting, 44 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 23, 29 (2004) ("Whether or not you choose to 
register and therefore avail yourself of the tax-exempt status that 527 makes 
available is voluntary. . . .  But we do not understand the statute to say that whether 
or not you're a political organization is a voluntary matter."). 
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conclusion.  The organization that guesses wrong stands not only to 
lose its 501(c)(4) status but also to face severe penalties for failure 
to comply with the registration and disclosure requirements of § 
527.  Unlike the case of 501(c)(3)s, political activity does not just 
delimit the end of a tax subsidy.  Which side of the 501(c)(4)/527 
line an organization falls on determines significant legal 
obligations.237  For nonprofits to have a reasonable chance of 
complying, they must have clear rules. 
Thus, there is a plausible argument that the Constitution 
demands that an objectively determinable line be drawn defining 
the scope of political activity that will cause a 501(c)(4) to lose its 
exemption if it is the organization’s primary activity.  (Similar 
arguments apply to activity that will trigger the 527(f) tax, but that 
is not the topic of discussion here.)  If the question is not resolved 
legislatively or administratively it may be that the courts will be left 
to decide. 
C. Restrictions on Political Speech Under Election Law 
If these rules are problematic when applied as a condition to 
recognition of tax exemption, the recent attempts by certain 
campaign reform proponents and members of the FEC to import 
them into federal election law is of even greater concern.  The 
vague standards of the tax code are fundamentally unsuitable for 
use as a general standard for regulating electoral speech. 
1. The Political Committee Rulemaking 
As the country faced its first post-BCRA election, many 
interests were attempting to take the new landscape of federal 
election law into account.  The stakes were—and, as we write this, 
still are—high.  The 2000 presidential election was the closest in 
this country’s history.  The deep partisan divisions left by decades 
of often vicious inter-party warfare were worsened by the aftermath 
of the November 2000 elections and fundamental policy 
disagreements between the parties about critically important issues.  
Political ideologues scrambled to find any advantage they could in 
the new, untested federal election laws.  Those who had succeeded 
 
 237. These legal obligations include the requirement that § 527 organizations 
register within twenty-four hours of establishment and file monthly or quarterly 
reports with the IRS that include donor and expenditure information.  See I.R.C. 
§§ 527(i),(j),(k). 
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in passing BCRA were committed to making sure that they would 
keep their hard-won victory, and perhaps even extend it. 
Certain political operatives, primarily, but not exclusively, on 
the left, believed that it was necessary to create new, independent 
entities to support the soft-money operations—particularly base-
mobilizing voter registration and GOTV efforts, but also issue 
advertising—that the parties were less able to fund in the wake of 
BCRA’s soft-money ban.  Often (but not always) these new entities 
were established as non-party 527 organizations238 to permit large 
donors to make unlimited contributions free from fear of the gift 
tax.  The creation of these new 527 organizations, and the gifts 
made to them by several large donors, were prominently reported 
in the media, often with the assistance of the organizations and 
donors themselves.239 
While not intended as such, these new organizations were a 
finger in the eye of those in the campaign reform community who 
believed that the intent of BCRA was to eliminate the use of 
unlimited funds to influence elections.240  Several of these reform 
organizations sought theoretical constructs to regulate the newly 
emerged 527s. 
These reform groups found allies in the Republican National 
Committee and right-leaning advocacy organizations.  Republicans 
had been slower to embrace the post-BCRA 527 strategy.  The 
reason for this may have been a belief that Republicans’ long-
standing advantage over the Democrats in attracting ‘hard’ political 
contributions to candidates and parties would be multiplied by the 
increases in hard money limits under BCRA, making Republican-
leaning 527s unnecessary.  Republican control of the White House 
and both houses of Congress likely gave the party further reason to 
believe that its hard money fundraising would be successful.  It may 
have been that Republicans expected to instead rely on support 
from Republican-leaning 501(c)(6) trade associations.  Whatever 
the reasons for the apparent Republican reluctance to embrace the 
use of 527 organizations, the party was certainly eager to see 
 
 238. As discussed, supra Part II.A, the authors are using the popular, and 
inaccurate, term ‘527 organization’ to refer to independent entities organized 
under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code that are not currently required to 
register as political committees under FECA. 
 239. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Liberals Form Fund To Defeat President; Aim Is to 
Spend $75 Million for 2004, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2003, at A3; Glen Justice, George 
Soros Gives, and Republicans React with Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at A2. 
 240. See discussion of BCRA’s purposes, supra note 4. 
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Democrats, as the primary proponents of campaign finance reform, 
feel a bit of pain related to the new law.  Thus, the high-profile 
early success of Democratic-leaning 527s helped to forge a new 
alliance of convenience between the anti-527 campaign reform 
groups, the Republican National Committee, and other Republican 
or right-leaning groups. 
These strange bedfellows, the reform community and the 
Republicans, looked to BCRA and the ruling upholding it in 
McConnell v. FEC to find a broader alternative to Buckley’s narrow 
“express advocacy” test.  In McConnell, the Court had reminded us 
that “express advocacy” was only one possible way to define the 
scope of political speech that could be regulated by government 
without violating the First Amendment.241  The Court upheld 
another when it approved BCRA’s provisions related to 
electioneering communications.242  In addition, the Court upheld 
BCRA’s ban on the raising and use of soft-money by state parties to 
fund “federal election activities,” defined as including “any public 
communication” that “refers to a clearly identified [federal] 
candidate” and “promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes” such a 
candidate.243  The anti-527 coalition believed that if the Supreme 
Court had upheld this broad test as constitutional in the context of 
soft-money restrictions on parties, then it would also pass 
constitutional muster in the context of a restriction on 
independent groups. 
The reform coalition’s hopes for a broader standard with 
 
 241. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003).  This 
ruling breaks no new ground in this regard.  Buckley already made it clear that the 
express advocacy standard was merely the Supreme Court’s best line-drawing 
effort when presented with the vague and overbroad language of the original 
FECA.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1976).  The real issue—in 1976, in 
2003, and still today—is who may engage in that line-drawing—only Congress and 
the Supreme Court, or the FEC as well? 
 242. See McConnell, 124 S.Ct. 619 (ruling that definition of electioneering 
communications in BCRA lacked the problems of vagueness and overbreadth that 
led the Court to apply the express advocacy standard in Buckley). 
 243. Id. at 675 (upholding restrictions on party communications within 120 
days of an election that promote, support, attack, or oppose a candidate as “closely 
drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address”).  The Court 
suggested that the “promote, support, attack, or oppose” standard was easy to 
apply and gave it only limited discussion when approving it in the context of 
communications by political parties, which might be presumed to be engaged in 
activities designed to get their candidates elected.  Id. at 675 n.64.   We suggest 
that the standard is far more difficult to apply and would be subject to a more 
extensive and probing Supreme Court review if it were applied, instead, in the 
context of independent organizations. 
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which to regulate 527s relied on language from Buckley that 
suggests that, while an “express advocacy” or other bright-line 
standard was generally necessary to preserve the constitutionality of 
attempts to restrict independent election-related speech, groups 
that primarily existed to support or oppose federal candidates 
could be more broadly regulated.244  The would-be reformers 
reasoned that because under federal tax law a 527 organization was 
operated primarily for the purpose of engaging in “political” 
exempt functions under 527(e), then these organizations were 
among those that the Supreme Court had suggested could be more 
broadly regulated. 
Effective advocacy from this coalition and, more to the point, 
its supporters on the FEC, led to an attempt in the spring of 2004 
to put this theory into regulation.  The FEC’s notice of proposed 
rulemaking on Political Committee Status (NPRM 2004-6) 
proposed that an organization that in any year spends certain 
threshold amounts on so-called “federal election activities” would 
be a federal political committee and thus be subject to strict 
fundraising limitations under FECA.245  These “federal election 
activities” included nonpartisan voter registration and GOTV 
efforts, and any activity that “promotes, supports, attacks, or 
opposes” a candidate for federal office.246  In these situations, 527 
 
 244. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79–82 (upholding against vagueness challenge 
restrictions on “organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the 
major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate”).  However 
the Court explicitly references in this discussion its early holding overturning 
similar restrictions on independent organizations, and the Court only applied this 
definition in the context of express advocacy communications by those 
committees.  Id.  It seems unlikely that the Court intended this language to be the 
basis of broader restrictions of groups not controlled by candidates and not 
engaged in express advocacy. 
 245. See 69 Fed. Reg. 11,736 (Mar. 11, 2004) (proposing definitions of 
“political committee”); 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C), 441b, 441c (West 2004) 
(limiting individual contributions to a maximum of $5,000 per year and 
forbidding contributions to political committees by corporations, union, foreign 
nationals, and government contractors).  This summary of some of the key points 
of the proposal utterly fails to convey the vast scope of this rulemaking.  Many of 
the complaints from commentators on all sides of the debate criticized the scope 
of the proposed regulations and the difficulty in responding coherently.  See, e.g., 
Comments of Democracy 21, the Campaign Legal Center, and the Center for 
Responsive Politics, supra note 6.  The problem was particularly acute given that 
the FEC was pursuing an accelerated schedule, with the hope of finalizing 
regulations in time for the 2004 elections. 
 246. 69 Fed. Reg 11,736 (Mar. 11, 2004) (citing 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.24(b)(1)-
(3)). 
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organizations would automatically be treated as federal political 
committees.247 
In short, the NPRM sought to couple a new test for political 
activity—“promote, support, attack, or oppose”—with the IRS 
definition of 527 status.  That status would be sufficient to force an 
organization to become a “political committee” under FECA and 
trigger application of this ill-defined standard.248 
The proposal generated a traffic jam of nearly 200,000 
comments, which was more than the FEC had ever received on a 
single proposal.249  A huge number of comments came from tax-
exempt organizations that (correctly) feared that adopting the 
proposed rules as written would effectively curtail their legitimate 
election-related activities. 
In April, the Commission voted to delay the rulemaking for 
ninety days to study the matter further, effectively ending any 
chance that new rules would be in effect in time for the 2004 
federal elections.250  In August, the FEC’s General Counsel 
produced a new proposed final rule that likewise would have 
regulated many 527s as political committees.251  Although still 
flawed in the eyes of the authors,252 the new draft was responsive to 
the concerns expressed in many comments the FEC received in 
response to the earlier NPRM.  In particular, the new proposal did 
not sweep all 527s into the FEC’s regulatory net.253  However, the 
 
 247. Id. at Alternative 2-A and 2-B. 
 248. In practice, the “promote, support, attack, or oppose” standard may not 
be as clear as the McConnell Court seemed to suggest, at least outside the context 
of political parties.  During the FEC’s meeting to consider Advisory Opinion 2003-
37, the Commissioners engaged in an extended debate from the dais about 
whether or not a particular communication “attacked or opposed.”  Audio tape: 
Fed. Election Comm’n Open Meeting (Feb. 18, 2004) (on file with authors and 
available from the FEC). 
 249. Lisa Getter, The Race to the White House; Hearings Open on Spending by 
Advocate Groups; Some members of election panel call the timetable on proposed new rules 
unworkable, L.A. TIMES, April 15, 2004, at A24. 
 250. See Minutes of an Open Meeting of the Federal Election Commission May 
13, 2004 (Agenda Document 04-51, Approved June 10, 2004). 
 251. Draft Final Rules for Political Committee Status (Agenda Document No. 
04-75 for FEC Open Meeting Agenda for Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.fec.gov 
/agenda/mtgdoc04-75.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004). 
 252. See Letter of August 17, 2004, from Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & 
Eisenberg to FEC, http://www.harmoncurran.com/HCSE%20PolComLtr.pdf  
(last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (criticizing certain flaws in the draft and requesting that 
the FEC seek further public comment before proceeding with the rulemaking to 
define “political committee”). 
 253. See Draft Final Rules for Political Committee Status, supra note 252, at 
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proposal failed to muster the four votes necessary for adoption.254  
Instead the FEC passed only the portion of the proposal related to 
the rules for allocating disbursements between federal and non-
federal political committee accounts, and the portion expanding 
the definition of “contribution” to include funds received in 
response to certain fundraising solicitations.255 
Campaign reformers have expressed their anger at what they 
see as the latest FEC derogation of its duty and have threatened to 
pursue regulation of 527s through possible congressional action or 
litigation.256 
2. Vagueness 
It is unnecessary to restate the detailed criticism of the 
vagueness of the tax standards for defining political activity.  As 
should be clear from the discussion above, the apparent simplicity 
of the tax law’s definition of political activity and the seeming 
consistency of the regulatory scheme encompassing different types 
of tax-exempt organizations masks the fundamental problem with 
the system: its inherent vagueness and subjectivity.  These problems 
are insurmountable in the context of the constitutional review that 
federal election laws face. 
FECA regulates core political speech and imposes criminal 
penalties for violations.  Thus, FECA is especially intolerant of 
vague standards.  As the Court explained in Buckley: 
 
Due process requires that a criminal statute provide 
adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that 
his contemplated conduct is illegal, for ‘no man shall be 
held criminally responsible for conduct which he could 
not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ Where First 
Amendment rights are involved, an even ‘greater degree 
of specificity’ is required.257 
 
Given the strict scrutiny with which the courts would view any 
 
proposed § 100.5 (proposed regulations that would treat some, but not all, 527 
organizations and other organizations as federal political committees). 
 254. Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Votes 4-2 to Adopt Limited New Rule Requiring “Hard 
Money” for Some 527 Groups, BNA MONEY & POLITICS REPORTER, Aug. 20, 2004. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (citing U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 
612, 617 (1954) and Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)). 
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general restriction on political activity, no court could possibly find 
that the IRS definition of political exempt-function activities for 
527 organizations would provide the necessary “adequate notice” to 
survive a constitutional challenge for vagueness. 
3. Overbreadth 
To survive Supreme Court review, any law regulating federal 
electoral activities must be necessary to achieve a compelling 
governmental purpose.  The Supreme Court has been willing to 
find the compelling purpose in the need to protect the democratic 
process from the threat of corruption.258  However, in attempting to 
import the tax-law definitions of political activity, the reformers 
have attempted to restrict activities far in excess of those necessary 
to achieve that goal. 
An effort to bring all 527 organizations under FECA’s 
restrictions on political committees, as was suggested in the most 
recent political committee rulemaking and by some submitting 
comments, would regulate a wide range of activities protected 
under the First Amendment.259  The IRS has long recognized that 
its standards for identifying political activity by tax-exempt 
organizations capture far more activity than is regulated under 
federal election law.260  As discussed above, many examples exist of 
legitimate activities that would be swept into the regulatory net of 
the FEC if all 527s are treated as political committees under federal 
election law. 
At the outset, it should be obvious that any federal attempt to 
regulate all 527 organizations would be excessive. Many 
organizations that qualify for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 527 are 
not primarily engaged in influencing federal elections.  These 527 
organizations operate, in whole or in part, to influence state or 
 
 258. Id. 
 259. See NPRM 2004-6, supra note †, at 11,741; Letter from Democracy 21 et al., 
to FEC, supra note 6. 
 260. The IRS has recognized that its congressionally granted authority to 
restrict political activities of tax-exempt organizations is appreciably greater than 
the Commission’s authority to regulate political speech more generally.  In its 
training manual for IRS examiners and other staff, the IRS states, “[t]he language 
of IRC 501(c)(3) indicates a much broader scope to the concept of participation 
or intervention in a political campaign.”  See Memorandum for Churches on Election 
"Voter Guides," 30 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 193, 196 (2000) (contrasting the ruling of 
the court in Federal Election Commission v. Christian Coalition, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 
2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999), in which the court held that a narrow definition of political 
activity was constitutionally necessary under federal election law). 
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local elections or to influence nominations for appointed offices 
such as judicial nominations.261 
Even in the context of races for federal elective office, there 
are numerous activities that the tax code recognizes as 527 exempt 
function activities—activities that could lead the IRS to classify an 
organization as a 527—that are beyond the constitutional reach of 
FECA.  Some 527s engage in activities related to federal election 
activities that fall within this gap, making per se treatment of them as 
federal political committees inappropriate.  Drawn from the rulings 
discussed above, each of the following examples describes an 
organization that the IRS would consider to be a 527 organization 
subject to FECA restrictions regulating all 527s organizations as a 
class: 
 
• The sole activity of a 527 organization created to 
“elevat[e] the standards of ethics and morality . . . in 
the conduct of campaigns for [political office]” is 
seeking candidate commitment to the organization’s 
“code of fair campaign practices.” The organization 
produces materials that list the names of candidates 
who support the code.  The IRS has ruled that an 
organization that approaches all candidates for office 
and asks that they sign or endorse such a code has 
engaged in an activity that “constitutes participation or 
intervention in a political campaign.”262  Under current 
 
 261. The 2004-6 NPRM’s Alternative 2-B would have regulated all 527s, but 
Alternative 2-A would have exempted 527s that engage in some of these purposes 
other than influencing races for federal elective office.   Yet even Alternative 2-A 
would only have exempted 527s engaged “solely” in these non-federal activities.  It 
is possible that a 527 organization might engage in some federal election activities 
but be primarily engaged in efforts to influence state and local elections.  For 
example, a 527 organization might dedicate twenty percent of its efforts and 
resources to federal election activities with the remainder going to non-federal 
‘exempt function’ activities.  Yet under Alternative 2-A, the slightest taint of activity 
related to federal elections would have forced the 527 organization to operate 
under the restrictive rules governing federal political committees.  2004-6 NPRM, 
supra note †.  Finally, as noted above, the most recent draft rules from the FEC’s 
General Counsel would not have regulated all 527 organizations, but even this 
draft would have applied more stringent standards to 527s than to other types of 
tax-exempt organizations.  See Draft Final Rules for Political Committee Status, 
supra note 252, at proposed sections 100.5(a)(3)–(6) (setting forth proposed rules 
making it more likely that certain 527 organizations would be treated as political 
committees).  
 262. Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2 C.B. 151 (modifying Rev. Rul. 66-258, 1966-2 C.B. 
213). 
61
Kingsley and Pomeranz: A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
KINGSLEYPOMERANZ- (LS & CB).DOC 10/3/2004  7:38:12 PM 
116 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
federal election law, this activity would not be an 
“expenditure”; it would not require federal “hard 
money.”263  Yet a 527 organization engaged solely in 
this activity would be treated as a federal political 
committee if the FEC were to import the tax law 
definition into election law. 
 
• The sole activity of a 527 organization is to publish 
advertisements to promote a particular state ballot 
measure.  None of these advertisements refer to a 
candidate for elective office, but the organization has 
evidence that the effort will likely bring out voters who 
tend to support a federal candidate running for 
reelection on the same ballot.  The IRS has ruled that 
this organization would qualify as a 527 organization 
and would not qualify as a 501(c) organization.264  
Under current federal election law, this activity would 
not be an “expenditure”; it would not require federal 
“hard money.”  Yet a 527 organization engaged solely 
in this activity would be treated as a federal political 
committee if the FEC were to import the tax law 
definition into election law. 
 
• The sole activity of a 527 organization devoted to 
improving the quality of elected officials is rating the 
qualifications of all candidates for Congress and 
publishing the results prior to an election.  The ratings 
are not based on political ideology but rather on 
nonpartisan criteria including the candidates’ prior 
governmental experience, a survey that asks public 
officials (such as state legislators, governors, mayors, 
and other members of Congress) and members of the 
press to identify those candidates who are “effective,” 
and an evaluation of the candidates’ responsiveness to 
constituent requests for assistance.  In many cases, the 
 
 263. See 11 C.F.R. 114.4(c)(5)(i) (2004).  (For purposes of this and all 
subsequent examples, we assume that there is no issue of coordination with 
candidates.) 
 264. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999) (effort to support ballot 
measure is ‘exempt function’ activity if organization has evidence to show that 
work would support or oppose a candidate for elective office). 
62
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss1/2
KINGSLEYPOMERANZ- (LS & CB).DOC 10/3/2004  7:38:12 PM 
2004] CRASH AT THE CROSSROADS 117 
ratings do not indicate the preferred candidate in a 
particular race because all candidates for that race 
share the same rating.  Faced with a tax-exempt 
organization that conducted a similar nonpartisan 
rating project for state judicial candidates, the IRS 
ruled that the organization had intervened in an 
election, and the court considering an appeal from the 
IRS decision stated that although this activity was 
nonpartisan and in the public interest, it nevertheless 
constituted participation or intervention in a political 
campaign.265  Under current federal election law, this 
activity would not be an “expenditure”; it would not 
require federal “hard money.”  Yet a 527 organization 
engaged solely in this activity would be treated as a 
federal political committee if the FEC were to import 
the tax law definition into election law. 
 
• The sole activity of a 527 organization is publishing a 
voter guide for its members and others concerned with 
environmental issues.  The guide compiles incumbents’ 
voting records on selected environmental legislation of 
importance to the organization and provides a factual, 
objective summary of the policy issues that underlie 
each bill.  The guide contains no express statements in 
support of or in opposition to any candidate.  The 
guide is widely distributed among the electorate during 
an election campaign.  In analyzing a similar example 
as a 501(c)(3) activity, the IRS stated, “while the guide 
may provide the voting public with useful information, 
its emphasis on one area of concern indicates that its 
purpose is not nonpartisan voter education.”266  In a 
later Private Letter Ruling, the IRS confirmed this 
analysis, suggesting that a voting record distributed 
during the election season and focusing on selected 
 
 265. Ass’n of the Bar of New York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989). 
 266. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.  As discussed above, several IRS rulings 
suggest that failure to cover a broad range of issues in a voter guide, id., a 
legislative scorecard, id., or a candidate debate, Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73, will 
cause the IRS to treat the activity as political.  As a result any organization that 
focuses on a single issue and that wishes to engage in one of these activities as the 
organization’s primary purpose, must be organized as a 527 organization. 
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issues of importance to the organization would be an 
“exempt function” activity under § 527 of the I.R.C.267  
Under current federal election law, this activity would 
not be an “expenditure”; it would not require federal 
“hard money.”  Yet a 527 organization engaged solely 
in this activity would be treated as a federal political 
committee if the FEC were to import the tax law 
definition into election law. 
 
It is hard to imagine Supreme Court approval of a wholesale 
adoption of the IRS definitions of political activity when they could 
lead to criminal penalties under federal election law for 
organizations engaged in activities such as these. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In the months preceding the 2004 presidential elections, it was 
a beautiful time for a drive.  Campaign reform proponents had 
gotten a brand new car from Congress, and the Supreme Court 
had just finished gassing it up for them.  It is perhaps 
understandable that their collective foot may have been a little 
heavy on the accelerator as they headed down the highway. 
At the same time, the FEC decided to take a short cut through 
the intersection of tax and election law.  Unfortunately, the 
recently proposed rules skidded on the tax law’s slippery pavement 
and plowed headlong into the Constitution.  The regulatory vehicle 
is going to be in the shop until at least after the November 
elections.  We hope that when it returns to the road, it will follow a 
wiser route to reform.  Although we cannot provide a 
comprehensive roadmap to that destination, we hope that this 




 267. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 21, 1997). 
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